

Governance, Local Governments and the Constituency Development Catalyst Fund in Tanzania

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Abstract: Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) are decentralization initiatives which send funds from the central government to each constituency for expenditure on development projects intended to address particular local needs. A key feature of CDF schemes is that members of Parliament typically exert control over how funds are spent. This paper provides an overview of CDFs and whether they have made any difference in the management of public resources and in governance in Tanzania. It highlights the controversies the CDFs have raised including the questions raised by civil society organizations about the legitimacy of the legislative arm doing work meant for the executive. The findings show that the CDFs are yet to make an impact, are little

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known to the people whom they are meant to benefit, and have not adequately addressed the aspects of transparency and participation.

Keywords: Governance, Constituency Development Catalyst Fund, Tanzania Social Action Fund

Introduction

Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) are spreading rapidly throughout Africa and have been established or are under consideration in other regions as well. These go by different names in different places, and vary in their precise functioning. Such names include Electoral Development Funds, Member of Parliament Local Area Development Schemes, Constituency Development Schemes, and Priority Development Assistance Funds (Baskin, 2013). They however share a few basic characteristics. First, they represent an additional, or parallel, set of funding for the development of parliamentary constituencies that flows outside of decentralized government structures and line ministries. Second, in most cases, the Members of Parliament (MPs) have a substantial role in determining how and where these funds are spent. Third, these funds have tended to be exercised with limited oversight or accountability.

Supporters point out that, CDFs can redress the imbalance between executives and legislatures, mitigate the “winner takes all” quality of elections, give legislators a way to deliver essential goods and services to constituents, provide an opportunity for popular participation in development projects, and strengthen ties of constituents to representatives and legislatures (Baskin, 2013).

Others have pointed out cases where line ministries and local governments have systematically failed to deliver basic services or infrastructure at the local level over a number of decades and it has proven difficult to reform these institutions and make them more responsive to local needs. Thus, CDF would allow the central

government to bypass inefficient local structures and deliver goods and services directly to constituents. Related to this argument is that, constituents expect their representatives to provide them with direct benefits, and CDF simply allows MPs to better meet this expectation (Policy Forum, 2008).

Critics argue that CDFs fragment decision making on development away from the executive can upset the balance of power between the legislative and executive and lead to decreased accountability in the employment of funds and to the misuse of funds intended for development and delivery of needed services (Baskin, op. cit.). Tidmund et al.(as quoted by Policy Forum, 2008) in their research concluded that the constituencies did not need more funding mechanisms but ‘the focus should remain in addressing the systemic and systematic issues arising within the existing development financing arrangements for local government (which are many), strengthening the Office of Parliament, and reorienting the relationship between MPs and their constituents to its democratic rather than (apparent) financial basis.’

More criticisms come from civil society organizations like Policy Forum (Tanzania) which is comprised of over 70 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and Social Watch (Kenya). One core criticism questions the constitutionality of a program that gives MPs an executive spending role. Policy Forum (2008), for example, cites Article 63(2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) which allocates different roles for parliament and the executive branches – that of spending money for the latter and oversight for the former (URT, 1977). Allowing MPs to directly control or influence spending violates this separation of powers and undermines the oversight role of parliament (Gikonyo, 2008). Van Zyl (2010) echoes similar criticisms when he talks of weakening the oversight capacity of the legislature.

Other criticisms have to do with the way the CDF tends to undermine local government structures by shifting resources away from these structures and having the MP as the key decision maker with regard to funds, thereby politicizing the whole exercise (Opiyo, 2006). Finally,

there is some documentation in different countries of corruption, politicization of development investment, and lack of accountability for expenditure decisions.

While there has been heavy criticism of CDF by some, the program is quite popular with many citizens and most MPs. There is little systematic evidence on its functionality in terms of improving participation of people in their own development, transparency, accountability, and improvement in service delivery. It may be difficult to research these areas in part because CDF is spreading in countries where there is a fairly high degree of inefficiency and corruption already, and where local government tends to be weak. Indeed, this is one of the motivations for introducing CDF in the first place.

The recent introduction of the Constituency Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) in Tanzania, a Tanzanian version of the CDF, provides a unique opportunity to conduct some systematic research into these elements. This is because the program's incipient status allows us to establish a baseline with respect to the participation, transparency, accountability at least at the very outset of CDF implementation. Careful analysis of existing conditions in a set of constituencies and the tracking of these conditions over time can provide useful evidence of the impact of CDF on development and local government authorities.

This paper is an attempt to assess the functionality of the Tanzanian CDF in terms of awareness and participation of constituents, accountability and transparency issues surrounding it. The findings from this study will provide valuable inputs necessary for reforming the scheme in order to ensure greater transparency and effectiveness. The findings will also be relevant in shaping the poverty reduction agenda of developing countries as far as effective funding modality is concerned and also contribute to the current academic debates on the authenticity of the fund in poverty reduction. The paper is therefore divided into five sections – the introduction, some theoretical issues with regard to some of the key concepts, research methodology, findings and discussion and finally conclusion.

Background on Tanzania's CDCF

Tanzania's CDCF was announced in 2007¹. Several arguments were put forth in favor of its introduction, some of which were similar to those put forth in other countries (Policy Forum, 2008; Social Watch, 2006). First, MPs would be better equipped to respond to the needs of poor constituents who request direct benefits from them. Second, in bypassing line ministries and other ineffective development agencies at the local level, CDCF would result in speedier and more efficient development investment at the local level. MPs also argued that if district and regional officials have discretionary funds available to them, then MPs should also have discretionary funds. Finally, the demonstration effect of Kenya and Uganda, where CDFs have been in place for a number of years, was also used by Tanzanian MPs to justify the introduction of a similar facility at home. While drawing on regional examples, Tanzanian MPs have argued that the CDCF is also an improved version of the Kenyan CDF, one which amplifies the positive aspects of the program but also has enhanced accountability measures.²

Many civil society activists objected to the introduction of CDCF. They have put forth several of the arguments discussed above. Some activists feel that Tanzania has a particularly rich array of local government and alternative development funds that are likely to be undermined or whose efforts will simply be duplicated by CDCF. These include the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG) system, Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP) to mention a few, and various basket funds designed to channel financing to local

¹ In East Africa, the CDF has been available in Kenya and Uganda since 2003 and 2005 respectively and in August 2008, President Kikwete fully endorsed the introduction of CDF to Tanzania in his address to Parliament.

² It is important to note here, however, that the Act that established the Kenya CDFs has recently been amended and several of any shortcomings will have been addressed. In January 2013, Parliament enacted CDF Act 2013, hence effectively repealing CDF Act 2003 as amended in 2007.

government authorities for planned investments. Civil society has asked whether it makes sense to introduce yet another fund in parallel to these, or whether instead the focus should be on enhancing the capacities of local government to carry out its functions. Likewise, Tanzania has also had positive experiences with a different kind of social development fund, the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF), which channels resources to the local level without involving MPs in the execution of public funds. In addition, Tanzanian civil society has raised concerns that the rationale behind CDCF further perverts the role of parliamentarians. Rather than seek to clarify the role of different officials in the Tanzanian government system, or provide meaningful oversight for existing funds, MPs seem to be solely focused on enhancing their discretionary power over public money. This weakens both the accountability of expenditure, and the constitutional structure of Tanzanian society. MPs should not be permitted to become executors of projects or to forsake their oversight role.

At the moment, as in other countries, the debate over CDF is defined by MPs and other supporters claiming that CDCF will improve development, and pointing to alleged success stories in other countries, while opponents decry the logic of the new fund and argue that it will lead to mismanagement and the weakening of local government. Neither side has systematically documented the alleged benefits or detriments of CDCF, because the program is new in Tanzania, and the evidence that has been collected in other countries is mostly anecdotal and limited to a few studies. There is, therefore, an opportunity to generate useful and systematic data from Tanzania as the program unfolds.

Governance and the CDCF

Governance has been defined as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country's affairs at all levels (Hyden, 1992). Good governance may be thought of as a

system in which the exercise of such authority is set up so that power is divided constructively across the institutions of society (including the organs of state, civil society, and the private sector) and is prevented from being usurped by any singular institution, thereby minimizing the risk of it being abused (UNDP, 1997). Participation, transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and equity are instrumental to good governance. It is fashionable today to hear that it is necessary to have good governance as a means to development (Hyden, 2005). Good governance as prescribed by advocates includes several elements as mentioned above but there is more with such other ingredients like constitutionalism, the observance of human rights, and regular free and fair elections (UNDP, op. cit). It is believed that the combination of these elements creates a conducive atmosphere for the conduct of government business that is pro-people, and one that is likely to accelerate the development process. Many developing countries are at different stages of trying to have these features in place. Tanzania too is trying to achieve good governance. There have been different reform programs and projects including Local Government Reforms, Public Service Reforms, Financial Sector Reforms, as well as Legal Sector Reforms all aimed at improving governance. Further, there are efforts to make the government more efficient through e-government, among other efforts.

Participation

Participation in this context is concerned with how power and responsibility are shared among the state and the different social groups and classes in the development process. In many societies, it is common to find that relatively very few people share most of the power and wealth, while the majority remains powerless. This makes many view the concept of participation as one that will involve some kind of confrontation between the powerful and the powerless, the wealthy and the poor. Decentralization has been used in Tanzania as a means to redistribute this power (URT, 1977, Art 145, 146). For a meaningful

participation to happen there has to be active citizenship which leads to collective action by people, government engagement with the people, people making demands on government bodies, and people holding government bodies accountable (Pedersen, 2006). This is more so because in many cases the word participation is used with another term “popular” to create the term “popular participation”. From here one can clearly see that the many who are powerless are going to be given greater say, greater control over decisions, and resources. Thus, popular participation is best seen as the changing relationship between the relatively powerless and the powerful in an encounter in which the powerless become more powerful.

Participation and Decentralization

Participation is in most cases linked to the concept of decentralization. Decentralization on the one hand is expected to create conducive conditions for the effective control and coordination of development policy at the local level. When it operates quite well it also enhances the capacity to plan, budget, implement, and monitor development projects in the area in question. The ultimate outcome of such an arrangement is better and provides wider access to services and quality of services delivered by the budget spending units in the area.

Decentralization is the deliberate change in the organization of government involving the transfer of powers, resources and/or functions from the centre to the units of government administration at lower levels. Maeda (1987) defines decentralization as “a political strategy which aims at, inter alia, the promotion of peoples participation in the initiation, planning, and implementation of development programs, greater equality in resource allocation, and more accountability of public administrators to the local representative organs.” Decentralization stimulates local development – hence national development – especially when it is decentralization by devolution.

Accountability

Accountability means answerability for a person's action or behavior in the exercise of authority (Moncrieffe, 2001; Dwivedi, 1994). Indeed, in the study of politics, accountability is viewed as the ability to determine who in government is responsible for a decision or action and the ability to ensure that officials are accountable for their actions. Accountability therefore means holding elected or appointed officials entrusted with public mandate and organizations charged with managing public functions answerable for specific actions or activities to the citizens from whom they derive their authority. It then becomes 'the obligation to explain, justify, or answer questions about how resources have been used and to what effect' (Trow, 1996).

Romzek (2000) offers the most comprehensive framework for analyzing types of accountability relationships. Four basic types are identified: professional, administrative, legal and political. The last three are the types that are commonly found in elected local governments in most developing countries and these will direct the study. Political accountability system reflects a situation where the individual or agency has substantially more discretion to pursue relevant tasks and the review standards (Huisman and Currie, 2004). Political accountability relationships encourage officeholders to be responsive to the concerns of key interest groups such as the electorate. On the other hand, administrative and legal accountability systems are reflected in work arrangements and established judicial frameworks that allow individuals to base their decision-making and actions on internalized laid down rules and procedures (Dwivedi, 1994; Olowu, 1999).

Transparency

Transparency is the active disclosure of information by an organization allowing external actors to monitor the internal workings or performance of a government organization (Curtin and Meijer, 2006).

Transparency as it is used in governance literature implies, among other things, watching government from the outside. One element nearly all transparency definitions have in common is that transparency refers to the extent to which an organization reveals relevant information about decision processes, procedures, functioning and performance (Wong and Welch, 2004; Curtin and Meijer, op. cit).

The general transparency of the local public institutions refers to three key elements: openness towards citizens, decisional transparency towards citizens, and mechanisms of accountability and responsibility. The first element, openness, means openness towards the public at large about a public institution's structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, involving ready access to reliable, and comprehensive information on the institution's activities. A second element is decisional transparency towards citizens - a democratic government must offer to citizens the opportunity to understand its operations and participate in making decisions on local public issues. A third component of transparency could be the mechanisms of accountability and responsibility: people holding representatives accountable for their actions through control institutions and holding them responsible by means of not re-electing them if they find that they have not lived to their expectations.

Whether transparency of government will lead to higher levels of trust or not is discussed heavily throughout the literature. A widely shared opinion exists that transparency will lead to an open culture in government that benefits all (Hood, 2006). It is ultimately seen as 'something good' which will eventually increase citizen trust in government (Brin, 1998; Oliver, 2004). On the other hand, some other scholars argue that a greater degree of transparency generates the possibility to (unjustly) blame the government time and time again. Bovens (2003) warns about this 'dark side of transparency': when people can see everything behind the scenes of government this could lead to demystification of government. A fault by government can always be construed and if citizens, media, and politicians use transparency for their own gain with no restraints, this could result in 'politics of scandal.'

Nonetheless, the effect of transparency on trust remains disputed and although some studies have been carried out, the amount of empirical research on this topic remains limited (Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006).

Research Methodology

The Study Area

The research on the CDCF occurred at two levels: Analysis of aggregate national-level data on CDCF disbursement compared to other sources like TASAF and Council own revenue; and case studies of two constituencies where the process of CDCF decision-making and expenditure was observed at a more detailed level. Ilala Municipal Council (IlalaMC) and Iringa District Council were chosen for this study. These districts have been part of an ongoing study of decentralization in Tanzania conducted by Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA) in Tanzania and CMI (Norway). These districts were chosen because they vary across a number of key background factors: rural/urban, access to resources, distance from the country development capital (Dar es Salaam) and political composition (Ilala MC has three constituencies while Iringa DC has two).

Sampling Strategy

A multi-stage sampling method was used. A total of 20 census enumeration areas were identified (15 from Ilala MC and 5 from Iringa DC). From these enumeration areas a total of 13 wards were sampled (8 from Ilala MC and 5 from Iringa DC). At the baseline in 2011, a representative sample of 371 households was randomly sampled from the two councils as follows; 271 from Ilala MC and 100 from Iringa DC. A total of 242 (65 percent) males and 129 (35 percent) females were interviewed. Fewer females were interviewed than males because in

most households, if the male was around, he showed interest to be interviewed.

The same sampling strategy was adopted during the follow up study in 2012. A representative sample of 362 households was interviewed from the two councils as follows; 262 from Ilala MC and 100 from Iringa DC. The sample included 216 (60 percent) males and 146 (40 percent) females. The essence of conducting a baseline and a follow up study was to assess changes over time given the transforming political landscape in the country as spearheaded by the multi-party democracy.

Data Collection

Data from the households were collected using semi-structured questionnaire that had both open and closed ended questions. Further, selected men and women also participated in focus group discussions held with participants ranging from 7-10 members. Other respondents in the study were key informants such as officials from the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister's Office, Regional Administration and Local Government, Local Government Authorities, and the Bunge Office. All key informants were considered as strategic stakeholders who could provide information about the CDCF.

Data Analysis

The primary concern of this study was to find out how CDCF is performing in terms of awareness and participation of constituents, accountability and transparency issues surrounding it. Thus, descriptive research approach has been used. The approach involved collection of quantitative information and tabulation of the same in numerical form, such as scores on the number of times a person chooses a certain response and collection of qualitative information.

Descriptive statistics presented in frequency tables were used in

analyzing the quantitative data. Content analysis was used to analyze the qualitative data collected through open ended questions in the questionnaire and the qualitative data from the focus group discussion and key informants. This is a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of key messages from respondents. In the findings chapter, qualitative and quantitative data have been triangulated in providing evidence on the performance and functionality of CDCF.

Variables for Analysis

Citizen participation

The introduction of CDF programs is often justified on the grounds that it will incorporate local citizen participation in the development process. An important question here is whether or not CDCF leads to greater or lesser genuine participation in the development process at the local level. A related question is whether citizens perceive CDCF to be more responsive to their needs than local government. The following indicators have been used to measure citizens' participation:

- Availability and access to information on CDCF and other development projects in their area.
- Public knowledge and attitudes about projects funded by Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) through local government and by CDCF.
- Citizen awareness of participation opportunities within CDCF and activities of CDCF committees.

Transparency and accountability

One of the arguments for CDCF is that it can bypass the inefficient, incompetent, or corrupt line ministries and local governments. Key questions asked here include: Are CDCF projects less accountable than

local government funds because of the powerful role of the MP? Or Does the high visibility of CDCF actually increase public scrutiny of local expenditure? Is CDCF particularly prone to corruption when compared with other funding mechanism such as TASAF? Are officials associated with CDCF corruption more or less likely to be held to account? The following indicators have been used to measure progress in this area.

- Financial flows through CDCF and TASAF accounts.
- Auditing/monitoring of funds and sanctioning of officials related to CDCF and other local government expenditure.
- Public perception on the degree of public transparency around development projects.
- Public perception on corruption in CDCF relative to other development projects in particular TASAF.

Access to and quality of services

One rationale for the introduction of CDF programs around the world is the poor record of governments to deliver goods and services at the local level. Thus, CDF offers an opportunity for local communities to access capital goods, like schools and health facilities rapidly, bypassing inefficient line ministries and local governments. The key question here is whether CDCF in Tanzania achieve this or does it lead to duplication, lack of integrated services, and/or poorly planned investment. The following indicators are used to measure progress in this area:

- Quality of projects and implementation across CDCF and non-CDCF projects, particularly TASAF.
- Citizen perceptions of service delivery quality across CDCF and TASAF projects.
- Evidence on duplication of and/or lack of coordination with services offered by CDCF projects and TASAF projects.

Politicization

A major concern for critics of CDF-style programs is that they create opportunities not only for corruption, but for politicization of development spending. This may translate into enhanced spending just prior to elections or targeting of expenditure toward politically salient geographical areas or groups. CDCF also could lead to a greater role for MPs in local politics. Key questions raised here include whether MPs spend more time in their constituencies now that they have more money to spend there. Do they use CDCF as an opportunity to direct funds to favored areas or supporters, or to buy off opponents? Indicators to measure progress in this area include the following:

- Amount of CDCF spending that occurs immediately prior to elections (seasonal patterns of spending).
- Amount of time spent in constituency by MP, presence at meetings, interactions with local officials, etc.
- Extent and which MPs use CDCF as an opportunity to direct funds to favored areas or supporters, or to buy off opponents.

Findings

Knowledge about the CDCF

First and foremost one would expect that in the context of development process, the targeted population would have the knowledge about the presence of such a facility like the CDCF. This would allow them to be able to participate in the various activities related to the facility, including making sure that the resources available are used properly. Findings show that, to a large extent, this is not the case with the CDCF in the research areas. Only 9.2 percent of the respondents had heard about CDCF by 2009. In 2011 during the survey, 27 percent of the respondents only heard about the CDCF from the research team. The

2012 survey shows that 30 percent of the respondents either learned about the CDCF from the researchers (on the day of interview) at 25.7 percent or had not heard of it at all (4.7 percent). For those who have knowledge about CDCF they just know the term but not how CDCF is supposed to function. Compared with the knowledge of other government and programs and strategies, CDCF is least known.

Table 1. Knowledge of government programs and the East African Community

Respondent had heard of(%)	DSM	Other towns	Rural areas	Poorest third	Middle third	Least poor third	All
Kilimo Kwanza	73	71	61	55	68	81	68
EAC	62	65	51	45	57	75	60
MKUKUTA	47	42	36	29	40	55	42
CDF	20	23	18	16	18	28	21

Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2013).

It is assumed that three things contributed to the acquisition of knowledge by the people about the CDCF. First are the projects that are funded by the CDCF. Once they are seen probably people inquire and end up knowing that CDCF exists. Second, there must be some information sharing among the people and this would have contributed to the knowledge. Third, the politicians, especially the MPs would have mentioned the fund in their meetings with different sections of their electorate. It would seem too, that researchers and other people on different activities in the villages and streets may end up educating the people about such projects as the CDCF, as was the case with this survey's researchers.

Other issues of knowledge included whether the respondents had knowledge about the existence of a CDCF Committee and how it operated. The percentage of those who have heard about a CDCF Committee remained almost the same with 7 percent in 2011 and 7.2 percent in 2012. The 7.2 percentage is, however, out of an entire sample

in which 90.1 percent of respondents have no CDCFs in their areas. If the percentage is calculated for the areas where CDCF projects exist, then 72.3 percent of the respondents have heard about the CDCF Committee. When the respondents were asked about the way the committee was selected in the 2011 survey, 0.8 percent showed that they were aware which increased to 1.9 percent in 2012. When the figures are calculated basing on the areas that have CDCF projects, this percentage turns to 19.4 percent. The remaining 80 percent – a high percentage - is unaware of CDCFs. It was further noted that these committees do not have scheduled time for meetings. They meet when the funds are disbursed and per convenience of members, especially the MP.

Information on CDCFs

The electorate needs information about what is happening in their area as well as on the development front. As such they would need information about the CDCF as to what programs, for example, that are running and whether there are hitches which need to be sorted out with their assistance. Dissemination of information with regard to the CDCF seems to have been and still remains problematic. Table 2 illustrates this very well in that the sources closer to the people like the MPs, councilors, and the ward and village leadership have very low scores in the 2011 survey with no improvement in the 2012 survey. When one compares with the radio as a source, these scores are very low considering the closeness these officers are expected to be to the people. The village assembly seems to have a respectable score in comparison at 20 percent for 2011 and 10.5 percent for 2012 survey. The reasons are rather obvious in that it is at those meetings that the people are given information on different issues as well as answers to their questions. The forum can and should, therefore, be a good source of information to the people.

For the 2011 survey, social networks showed to have a big role to play as well. It was the second highest scorer when it comes to its

potential as the source of information in the neighborhood after radio with a score of 59 percent. For the 2012 survey, television is the second. Probably this is the case in areas where there is electricity echoing the over sampling of households from Dar es Salaam (86 percent of respondents from Ilala MC mentioned TV as a source of information compared to only 22 percent in Iringa DC).

Table 2. Primary sources of information

Primary source of information	% of respondent	
	2011	2012
Newspaper	55	50.6
Radio	92	91.7
Friends/relatives/social networks	59	23.2
TV	56	68.5
Village assembly	20	10.5
Village officers	9.2	5.5
Mobile phones	7.5	10.8
Councilors	2.7	0.3
Ward officers	2.2	1.4
Internet	2	0.3
Member of Parliament	1.1	1.1
District officers	0.3	0

CDCF Projects

Information from the Ministry of Finance shows disbursement of CDCF to councils for the financial years 2009/10, 2010/11, and 2011/12. In 2009/10 a total of 4.4bn Tanzanian shillings (TShs) were released in April 2010 and the same amount was also released in May 2010 making a total of TShs 8.8bn³. In 2010/11 and 2011/12, a total of about TShs 9bn was released to all constituencies in the country for each year. This

³ At the time of writing this paper, 1USD was approximately equal to TShs 1600.

means that a fixed amount is budgeted per year regardless of the needs of the constituencies. The CDCF funds are disbursed to the constituencies through the Councils' development account.

In 2011, the majority of the respondents argued that CDCF has benefited only a small minority of people in their constituencies (56 percent) and 39 percent echoed that CDCF has benefited none. The 2012 findings cemented the 2011 findings but with more respondents arguing that these funds have benefited nobody (83 percent). These findings are echoing the fact that the funds received per district per year are meager to implement any significant development project and may only be useful in self help projects. For instance, Ilala MC received a total of TShs 122.5m for 2011/12 financial year for its three constituencies (Ilala, Ukonga and Segerea) while the Council was collecting more than TShs 10bn from its sources annually. The Council also received about TZS 3bn for TASAF activities.

Citizens Participation

A series of questions inquired as to whether the respondents did ever have an opportunity to intervene (or participate) in prioritization, location or management of projects (any kind of project). For the 2012 data, there was the category of those who did not have projects in their villages or streets and therefore, as it can be seen in Table 3, the percentages are very low if calculated basing on the entire sample. But if we calculate the percentages basing on those who have had projects in their areas then they are quite impressive. Those who participated in selecting and prioritizing projects were 47 percent; those who participated in the selection of location at 37.5 percent and 8.3 percent for those who made follow up and monitoring of project progress.

Table 3. Participation in project development process

Intervention	2011			2012			
	Yes	No	% Yes	Yes	No	% Yes	% Yes**
Select and prioritize	47	324	11.9	18	20	5.0	47
Determine Location	44	327	12.7	15	25	4.1	37.5
Follow up/monitoring	20	351	5.4	6	33	1.7	8.3
Managing project funds	9	362	2.4	-	-		-

** These percentages are for those respondents from areas with projects.

The 2012 survey indicated that people rate participation highly and they believe that participation of the people in development planning, implementation and monitoring are well regarded in their communities.

As it can be seen in Table 4, the involvement of the community is quite good at 42.5 percent for projects in general, and 5 percent for CDCF and 2.8 percent for TASAF which is another funding channel in the rural areas. Of course the figures for the two funding channels have been affected by the fact that some of the respondents did not have projects in the areas they live and therefore they fell under the not applicable category.

Table 4. Community involvement in new project decisions

Level of involvement	Projects general		CDCF projects		TASAF projects	
	Yes	%	Yes	%	YES	%
Very involved	41	11.3	2	0.6	5	1.4
Somehow involved	113	31.2	16	4.4	5	1.4
Not involved	106	29.3	14	3.9	3	0.8
Not applicable	-	-	329	90.9	347	0.6
Don't Know	102	28.2	1	0.3	2	95.9

Transparency and the CDCFs

The CDCF Act provides that at least 25 percent of all allocated money to CDCF shall be allocated equally to each constituency while the

remaining 75 percent should be disbursed on the basis of the constituency's population (45 percent), poverty margin (20 percent) and size of geographical area (10 percent). It is the CDCF Committee which oversees the implementation of CDF projects (URT, 2009). It is unclear how the poverty margin for a constituency is calculated and what data is used for the formula. Furthermore, the size of the total envelope allocated to the CDCF is not publicly known.

The allocation of TASAF funds also follow a formula based on three criteria – population which account for 40 percent, geographical size which account for 20 percent and poverty counts that account for 40 percent. Since using these criteria alone could cause vast differences between councils' allocations, 25 percent of the fund is first deducted and distributed equally to all Councils (same proportion as CDCF). The remaining amount is then distributed using a calculated composite index that combine population, geographic and poverty indices.

As discussed above, only 7 percent of the respondents have heard about CDCF Committee. Looking at its composition, the CDCF Committee is small and having very few members from the 'public.' This has made it rather obscure to the people. Given that the committee is not known by majority of community members, it make sense that only a fraction of the population knows how it is selected (0.8 percent) meaning that the selection and the publicity of the same in the CDCF processes are very limited or none. The information presented above on citizens' participation can be linked to decisional transparency. If community members are not involved in for instance, in prioritizing development projects and management of development projects as discussed above, it means that they are not involved in the whole decision making cycle.

The data from the 2012 survey show that about two thirds (62.8 percent) of the respondents from the areas with CDCF projects were satisfied that there was transparency. But looked at from the whole sample the percentage is relatively low at 8.5 percent. The issue here is whether the respondents had the same conceptualization of the term transparency as we defined it. The question would have asked about

“uwazi” – a Swahili word for openness.

Accountability and the CDCFs

Monitoring of Development Projects

The CDCF draws its resources from the public purse and CDC funds are channeled through the usual council funds disbursement mechanisms as well as monitoring and evaluation. The money is channeled through the development account just like TASAF and LGCDG funds. There are several ways in which the fund is monitored. First, there is the audit function which has two parts – the internal and external to the Council. Like all other funds, the CDCF has to undergo the audit process.

The second monitoring tool is the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority's (PPRA's) processes and regulations. This is why after all political processes of deciding on projects, prioritizing and so on the Council has to take over. After the CDCF committee has decided on which projects to fund, the tender is floated by the council for relevant service providers to bid. Further, the council tender committee is responsible to scrutinize all the bids and make award to the best bidder. The third control mechanism includes the several Council Committees to whom the expenditures have got to be reported. The topmost committee is the Full Council where all projects and expenditures have got to be reported. All citizens are welcome to this forum.

Fourth, it is the people themselves who are supposed to benefit from the fund. These are the ones on the ground all the time and they see what is happening. They must be the most appropriate stakeholders to blow the whistle when things are not going the way they should. However, as noted in the section discussing corruption and how people reacted to corrupt acts, the people may react differently with so many not wanting to report such cases. Of late there have been Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which track public funds and the way they are

spent. The CDCF should not be an exemption but due to its newness, it seems there is more time needed before it is an interesting funding channel as are the others like funds for primary and secondary schools which have been scrutinized critically. On the whole, therefore, one would correctly conclude that there are adequate mechanisms to monitor the CDCF as CDCF expenditures are scrutinized through financial control mechanisms just like other development funds.

But it is worth mentioning that the last mechanism – that of the people monitoring such funds as CDCF's is very weak as data from the surveys indicate that very few people see or believe that the public is monitoring these funds and the activities tied to them. Compared to TASAF, some key informants were, more positive about the workings of TASAF noting that given the way projects are introduced and the role given to communities, the communities were in a very good position to monitor projects. One good channel, through which this could happen, according to these informants, is that a TASAF project must have a bank account controlled by the TASAF committee on behalf of the recipient community. This is a facility which can be monitored easily by say, demanding bank statements and so on. With the CDCF they were not as positive. They thought the MP had too much say and controlled the fund in ways that the community could not check as was the case with the TASAF.

Corruption and the CDCFs

Corruption is a big problem in Tanzania and it is ubiquitous. The CDCF is, therefore, not immune to this vice. A set of questions was prepared and the respondents indicated what their experience was with regard to the issues raised in the questions. The first question was about whether a person in a household had observed a corrupt act by a local public official in any development project in the area. A third of the respondents (29 percent) confirmed that members of their households personally observed the phenomenon in their area. All projects

mentioned above were associated with corruption, even the TASAF projects. For instance, 1.9 percent of respondents from the 2012 survey said they have heard about corruption in TASAF projects. This is quite high if we consider that these are 7 respondents from the 17 who indicated that they were having TASAF projects in their areas. They constitute 41.1 percent if we are to calculate the percentage based on those who indicated that there are TASAF projects in their area.

In a society where the people are empowered citizens, incidents of corruption are reported to the relevant organs of state for action to be taken. In Tanzania it happens that people may not want to take such steps and for different reasons as it was found by the study. No action on earlier reported cases scored high in both surveys (Table 5). In 2012, a significant number of respondents also had a feeling that even if they reported they do not think that anything will happen and therefore it would be a wasted effort (53.5 percent).

Table 5. Reasons for not taking actions on corrupt incidences

Reason	2011		2012	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
They do not know what to do	70	18.8	111	30.7
They are scared of repercussions	121	32.6	37	10.2
They do not think it will help (no action to follow)	54	14.6	193	53.5
No action on earlier reported cases	198	53.4	216	59.7

Of those cases where the respondents believe some action may be taken against corrupt officials, the levels of confidence were different too. There are organs of state or offices in which the people have confidence that some action would be taken than in others. As such the media score very high compared to say, a village or ward office. What is important to note also is that the police score the lowest percentage. It is known that the Tanzania police have been named by research institutions such as Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), Fordia and Agenda Participation 2000 as one of the institutions where

corruption is rife in the different opinion surveys they have carried out at different times (see, for example, Agenda Participation 2000, 2011)⁴. No wonder then that if one reported a case to the police the likelihood would be that the culprit could be let off the hook through corruption.

The study has revealed an interesting pattern when it comes to the level at which project funds can be misused, including in corruption. The general pattern is that the higher the level one goes, the higher the chances that the funds will be misused. The implication here is that the people have no trust as far as the higher levels are concerned. The District level office scores 58 percent in corruption and the misuse of funds; the Ward level office 51 percent, the Councilor 34 percent and the village leaders around 20 percent. The Hamlet level has a 4 percent. There is a slight change in the 2012 statistics in that the Ward is not second in the likelihood of misusing funds. But the trend is more or less the same in that the higher the level the more likely that that is where misuse will take place. This should not be a surprise given experience in that it has always been the higher levels where graft takes place in a country, and impliedly therefore, that the District level was more likely to misuse funds than is the case with the hamlet or village level.

Quality and satisfaction with services

Customer satisfaction is a basic goal of any service provider. However, satisfaction is a complicated perception, one that takes into account process, quality, and results. Like happiness, each individual determines his or her satisfaction differently. Information was collected on quality of a variety of public services for 2011 and 2012. Civil services that were cited as the poorest quality in 2011 were: electricity (43.1 percent); garbage collection (31.3 percent), and water supply (28

⁴ Tanzania Police Force is still ranked one of the most corrupt institutions in Tanzania based on the Corruption Tracker System Report of 2011 on East Africa Bribery Index.

percent). In general all services were cited as being of poor quality ranging from 25.6 percent to 49.9 percent. In 2012 water services were ranked highest in terms of poor quality. This is possibility reflecting the recent cries from Dar es Salaam residents which were echoed in the news. Garbage collection also remained among the most cited poor quality services.

The quality of primary education was improving and in 2011 it was ranked first by 14.3 percent, followed by services provided by dispensary (14 percent) and secondary education (11.1 percent). Although primary and secondary education services were ranked to be very poor by 23.5 percent and 17.6 percent of respondents respectively in 2012, these are services which were also perceived to be of average quality by majority of the respondents. Also, while electricity services were ranked to be very poor in 2011 (43.1 percent of the respondents), in 2012 these services were perceived to be of average quality (48.0 percent). This might be reflecting the current change in the management of these services including having a new Minister for Energy and Minerals.

Thirdly, the statistics on primary education, secondary education and dispensary also conforms to the key informants interviews. Respondents mentioned that development of both primary and secondary education was given due priority in their development plans. Hence desks and classrooms upgrading was seen as important for the development of education sector. Key informants also mentioned that TASAF and Local Government capital Development Grant (LGCDG) played a very big role in improving the primary health care (dispensaries) and classrooms upgrading. The meager resources channeled as CDCF have also contributed to the development of education, health and water sectors as exemplified by examples from Iringa District Council (Table 6).

Table 6. Projects funded by CDCF, Iringa District Council

Type of Project	% of total allocated funds (2010/11)		% of total allocated funds (2011/12)	
	Kalenga	Ismani	Kalenga	Ismani
Water projects		23		
Health projects (construction and rehabilitation of dispensaries)		25		11
Primary school projects (construction, rehabilitation, and procurement of desks)	51	45	94	15
Secondary school projects (construction, rehabilitation, procurement of desks)	21		4	56
Other activities	28			18

Source: United Republic of Tanzania (2011, 2012).

The study further wanted to get the views of respondents on their satisfaction or dissatisfaction on the matters related to CDCF and TASAF projects. Levels of dissatisfaction with CDCF projects are alarming mainly reflecting minor projects that have been implemented under the Fund and the minimal involvement of communities at the grassroots level (Table 7). From the statistics, it is clear that a greater majority of respondents were very dissatisfied and dissatisfied with some of the key indicators of performance on the CDCF projects. Overall, the accountability of CDCF duty bearers to the community took a lead in the most/very dissatisfying indicator (63 percent), followed by transparency in the management of the CDCF funds (57 percent). Findings on TASAF projects are not substantive given that these were implemented in very few communities.

Table 7. Ranking of satisfaction with performance of CDCF projects (N=35)

Indicators of performance criteria	Very dissatisfied (%)	Dissatisfied (%)	Indifferent (%)	Satisfied (%)	Very Satisfied (%)
How projects are identified	17	51	17	6	9
Types of projects	26	17	37	11	9
Location of projects	20	34	26	11	9
Transparency in management of funds	57	31	6	6	0
Community participation in decision making (voice)	49	29	11	11	0
Composition of CDCF committees	42	34	17	3	3
Time taken to implement projects	26	49	17	9	0
Equity and targeting (addressing the needs of the most needy e.g. remote areas, disabled etc)	34	51	9	6	0
Building capacity/creating opportunities for people to benefit more	49	37	11	3	0
Accountability of CDCF duty bearers to the community	63	31	7	0	0

Politicization of the CDCFs

The amount of CDCF spending that occurs immediately prior to elections or any seasonal patterns of spending can be attributed to political patronage. As shown above, a fixed amount of CDCF is budgeted regardless of the needs of the constituencies and the funds were released in the last quarter of each financial years ruling out the possibility that the funds could have been used to influence the 2010 elections which were held in October 2010.

At baseline, a small proportion of respondents indicated that their MPs are involved in development projects in their community (22 percent). This increased to 38 percent in 2012. Opinions differed on where the MP will most likely implement development projects. While

majority had the opinion that the MP would implement programs in areas where he/she has more political support in both surveys (37 percent and 40 percent respectively), 40 percent and 27 percent respectively mentioned that they do not know. While the first opinion reflects politicization of the fund, the second opinion is more objective because a majority of the citizens do not have knowledge on CDCF and how the funds are allocated. So, the first opinion is reflecting suspicion about the MPs and not necessary knowledge on whether the MPs have such powers. The 'don't know' response could also be suggesting that people do not really associate the MPs with development projects.

A question was asked on whether the MP has been helpful to the individual respondents. At the baseline, 66 percent of the respondents mentioned the MPs to be not very helpful and least helpful. The percentage decreased to 57 percent in 2012. This should not be a surprise because it has been the 'tradition' for most MPs not to be in their constituencies when the House is not in session. They have been blamed for only being in the constituencies a year before the next elections when they start wooing voters for the next round of elections. This phenomenon has also raised the debate about powers to recall MPs and if possible to unseat them if the electorate feels that they are not performing to their expectations. This, for sure, will also feature in the on-going process of writing of a new constitution for Tanzania.

Discussion and Conclusion

The study of Tanzania's CDF was conducted in order to shed some light on a few selected variables viz. citizen participation, transparency, accountability, political patronage, and quality of services provided as related to the operationalization of this financing facility. Baseline information was collected from two councils (one urban and one rural council) in 2011 and a follow up study in 2012 to unravel any improvement in these indicators.

The variables mentioned above are some of the indicators of the presence of good governance. The more of these in a political system the higher it stands with regard to good governance. Given that Tanzania is striving to have good governance in place,⁵ it was the expectation of the research team that these ingredients would be present at a commendable level when it comes to the CDCF. However, the picture that emerged showed that a lot needs to be done before this 'commendable' status is achieved.

Having noted that the fund's existence has been quite short to be able to exhibit some of the qualities implied in the variables, it is still in order to say that the levels were much lower than one could expect, as shown in this paper. Further, the volume of money involved in the CDCF could be a causal factor of the results from the survey with regard to the variables being observed. The money was peanuts in some of the councils when compared to what these councils normally have from their own sources and the funds from the intergovernmental transfers such as TASAF and LGCDG. This might have deviated attention from the CDCF. In the 2012 survey this was clearly mentioned as one of the challenges that face CDCF.

Citizen participation was affected by the lack of information and inactive citizenship. Participation in development projects and CDCF in particular has been low⁶. The structures for active citizenship are in place such as the fora for discussing development programs and projects. There include the councils, Ward Development Committees, village assemblies and so on. But lack of resources, especially information and other qualities of competent citizens, led to low participation in the decision making processes and in the running of the CDCF. This was not only for the CDCF, the TASAF is also facing the same problem. Once the projects are initiated and are running, the people leave the other

⁵ See URT (2010).

⁶ Similar shortcomings were seen in the Kenyan and Ugandan CDFs. See, for example, Republic of Kenya (2008).

processes like monitoring to the elected and selected representatives. This is not very good when one is striving for good governance.

As far as transparency and accountability are concerned, it was expected that the stakeholders especially the citizens would have had the capacity to engage the state in the four-way approach proposed by Pedersen (op. cit.) but this was not the case and the main reason was that some key inputs were missing and again, the main one being information. The flow of information has been problematic. The citizens are not informed enough about the new 'project' in town. The politicians seem not to have done their homework when it comes to publicizing the fund. When the citizen is starved of information, transparency and tracking accountability become a mirage. This means once some more effort is put into this area then things might change and the CDCF could be better managed because of the keen eye of the citizens on it. To a large extent, there is low accountability and transparency. However, that the CDCF is a parallel funding mechanism and this could lead to lack of accountability and transparency did not come out clearly as a key causal factor.

CDCF has also not been able to reduce inequity in spending and results to meaningful development projects in the communities. Improvement of service delivery as a result of this fund is not evident due to the limited amount of the funds allocated to the projects and the huge demand of improvement in services.

For the 2011 survey, the findings did not provide any evidence on prevalence of political patronage. However, political patronage can be implicit in the way the MPs were the decisive constituency when projects were being selected. MPs knew how much there was, they decided which project to go through, they decided how much they would give to a certain area, and the common citizens might not know the ulterior motives of the MP if there was any. But the entire move and support by MPs for this funding channel indicated that they intended to use the fund to garner influence and support in their constituencies. There is a case in court as brought about by civil society organizations based on the

constitutional provisions about the separation of powers as well as checks and balances – but the issue is that by sidelining these the MPs were likely to abuse the fund by unduly influence to the electorate.

In conclusion, the CDCF is one channel through which the government intends to implement development projects in communities. The fund is yet to make an impact due to its short existence as well as its volume vis-à-vis the other sources of funds and the needs in communities. The fund is facing some hurdles and challenges that need to be addressed immediately if it is to make an impact.

The first challenge has to do with its constitutionality. There has been a legal challenge as to why the legislators who have the oversight role over government have to engage in managing public funds and projects. The issue is yet to be settled but there is a point to that which needs to be cleared. This issue needs to be cleared in that most of the confusion with regard to the CDCF has to do with ignorance on how it works and who has which powers and to which extent. For instance, much as the MP may have the final say as to which project goes through (the presence of a CDCF committee notwithstanding), the implementation is a mandate of Council organs, including the respective Tender Board. Policy studies have shown that a lot changes or can change in the implementation phase. Policy is re-made and the end results can be very different from what was initially intended. The good thing with the CDCF so far is that it has been implementing what one can call micro projects which may not have a big impact on the political system if something was to go seriously wrong.

The other challenges have to do with its operationalization as the research findings have indicated. There are issues related to the whole idea of decentralization and the implied decision making processes which have to favor the local structures and people. These are yet to be either in place or need to be perfected. The conditions necessary for a locally-based program to work properly are yet to be in place. The issues related to people being informed and having the knowledge, people being in charge in terms of being part of the processes, and people being

the overall monitors are yet to be settled when it comes to the CDCF. Results from the 2012 survey indicate that the TASAF fares much better in this aspect as has been discussed with regard to the way projects are proposed, funded and monitored under TASAF as opposed to what happens with CDCF. The CDCF has so far been less transparent compared to other similar funding channels like the TASAF. These have got to be sorted out before the fund can be accepted as a legitimate funding mechanism.

Were the legal issues mentioned above to be sorted and leave the CDCF in a clear mandate for operation, several things would need to be done, it would seem. First, publicity of the fund needs to be boosted. With TASAF, there is the 'age' difference and which has put TASAF on the map more conspicuously than CDCF. There is need for the people in constituencies to know that such a fund exists. They should also know who has which powers because as it is now there is a lot of misinformation. Second, the level of participation by the people in the projects needs to be expanded. The structures in place seem inadequate to justify the expenditure of public resources. Here we are referring to the CDCF Committee which has very few members and its operations are not that transparent to target populations. Compared to the TASAF, the CDCF does not have as elaborate process and structure as the TASAF – a bank account for a project, a committee picked from the benefiting area and so on.

The third issue has to do with the monitoring of project funds and operations. Once the issue of publicity, structures and powers is sorted out, the people will have access to the way the fund operates and therefore, want to monitor what is going on. This is healthy for any such publicly financed channel of development agent. With the people's interest in the fund improved, then other issues that have been perceived as inappropriate such as corruption and misuse of funds would be controlled and make the fund a viable channel through which constituencies can enhance the chances of making progress towards nationally defined development targets.

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