



Abe and Trump's Legacy? Deconstructing Japan and the United States' Strategic Narratives of the Indo-Pacific

Švárová Kristýna¹, Kolmaš Michal²

¹Faculty of Social Science, Charles University

²Metropolitan University Prague

The article seeks to investigate the motivations for the Indo-Pacific in Japan and the United States. It challenges the assumption that there is a shared vision between the two countries despite their significant similarities in their terminology around the Indo-Pacific. Building on a strategic narrative framework, and the methodology of qualitative content analysis of Indo-Pacific related primary documents of both parties between 2016 and 2021, the article puts forward the argument that while both countries prioritize regional stability in the Indo-Pacific region, their narratives reflect distinct national interests and visions for the Indo-Pacific. While Washington's narrative corresponds to its underlying *national interest*, Japan's narrative encapsulates its vision of a viable *regional order*. These findings question the validity of the literature linking the foreign policies of the two countries and provide a rigorous analysis of the formation and proliferation of their narrative strategies.

Keywords: Strategic Narrative, Content Analysis, Indo-Pacific, Japan, Shinzo Abe, the United States, Donald Trump, Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Received June 24, 2024

First Decision Made July 1, 2024

Accepted July 24, 2024

Corresponding Author

Švárová Kristýna

Charles University, Faculty of Social Science, Smetanovo nábřeží 6, 110 01, Prague 1, Czech Republic

E-mail: svarova.kristyna@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION

There are many ways to understand the term *Indo-Pacific*. We can see it merely as a geographical description of the area encompassing the Indian and Pacific oceans, including the seas that connect them. Secondly, we can understand it as a geopolitical tool that helps politicians, researchers, journalists, etc., analyze the current challenges and problems of this part of the world. Thirdly, we can perceive it as a strategic concept, within which we can see significant security and economic cooperation between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia in recent years. Also, the Indo-Pacific can be viewed as a complex regional organization that guarantees political stability.

Finally, we can understand the Indo-Pacific in the context of a strategic narrative. There has been a steadily increasing trend of using the concept in countries' foreign policies. The European Union came with its Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021, in the United States (US), the Indo-Pacific sneaked in its security strategy in 2018. Many others have followed. Although there is increasing recognition of the role Indo-Pacific plays in structuring regional politics, there are many visions and motivations associated with accepting this new regional

demarcation. It is the aim of this paper to uncover underlying motivations for their respective Indo-Pacific strategies within the United States and Japan.

Both have often been narrated as the main instigators of the Indo-Pacific policy (Yeo, 2023), and have been very active in fostering it via political and economic cooperation. Both have also participated in the most important institutional bearers of the strategy including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). That said, does this mean that Japan and the United States share their interests connected to the region? In order to answer this question, we advance the understanding of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic narrative. Strategic narratives are defined as “*means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors*” and to gain legitimacy for policy responses. Political actors use strategic narratives to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment (Miskimmon et al., 2013: 3), or, in this setting “*promote their preferred conceptions of regional order*” (Barthwal-Datta & Chacko, 2020: 244).

This paper challenges the largely shared notion that these countries share the same vision for the Indo-Pacific. By analyzing Japan's and the U.S.'s strategic narrative of the Indo-Pacific, we aim to gain insights into the areas where states' perceptions of regional order align and diverge, uncovering the distinct political and social dynamics that shape these perspectives. We proceed in two steps. First, we analyze how the Indo-Pacific narratives were formed within Japan and the United States. Second, we dissect these narratives to understand whether these countries share common goals and motivations in shaping the strategic narrative of the Indo-Pacific. For this purpose, we build on Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA), and analyze official speeches, policy documents and press releases then place the narratives constructed in these texts in the broader domestic and international context in which they emerge.

The article puts forward the argument that although the existing literature understands close links between the motivation for and the practice of the Indo-Pacific regional formation, Washington's and Tokyo's strategic narratives differ in two major regards. While Washington's narrative corresponds to its underlying motivation of *national interest*, Japan's narrative encapsulates its vision of a viable *regional order*. These findings question the validity of the literature linking the foreign policies of the two countries and provide a rigorous analysis of the formation and proliferation of their narrative strategies.

LITERATURE REVIEW: SITUATING THE INDO-PACIFIC AS A STRATEGIC NARRATIVE

The Indo-Pacific concept has received significant attention in the last decade, not only in academic circles. Some scholars even use the word *buzzword* to describe the Indo-Pacific (Kolmaš et al., 2023; Wu, 2022) or as *an idea whose time has come* (Mecalf, 2019).

There are many ways to understand the Indo-Pacific. In general, the Indo-Pacific term refers to the interconnected geopolitical space between the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean, linking the Indian and Pacific oceans and emphasizing the rising strategic importance of the region. There is a large discussion whether the Indo-Pacific is a new creation or not. A part of authors have argued there are historical roots for the concept (Li, 2022; Mecalf, 2019; Pardesi, 2020). Others noted that the current reinvigoration of the term is unprecedented and treat the Indo-Pacific as a recent artificial construct (Kolmaš et al., 2023; Wilkins & Kim, 2022).

The Japanese late PM Shinzo Abe was perhaps the first one to apply the term to delineate the geopolitical boundaries of Asia in his seminal speech *Confluence of the Two Seas* in 2007. Several years later, Abe proposed the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) to integrate his vision into Japanese foreign policy. Abe did not specifically use the term Indo-Pacific in his speech. Instead, he presented a vision of a “*broader Asia*” (*kakudai ajia*), stressing the strategic importance of seeing the two oceans of the Indian and Pacific oceans as one, which later became the grounding principle for the Indo-Pacific strategy (Abe, 2007).

The United States adopted the term Indo-Pacific in its National Security Strategy in 2017. The Trump administration defined the Indo-Pacific region a place where “a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place.” Stating that “the U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic”, the NSS (2017) identified the Indo-Pacific as a region of growing importance and emphasized the need for the United States to work with partners and allies. The National Defense Strategy adopted by the Trump administration a year later identified China as one of the key security strategy threats to the regional order in the Indo-Pacific region (Kireeva, 2020: 109). In the following years, many other countries adopted the term Indo-Pacific, e.g., Indonesia, Vietnam, France, Thailand, the EU and others.

As the power dynamic in East Asia shifts and the Indian and Pacific Oceans start to be seen as one maritime space, many authors have perceived the Indo-Pacific concept mainly as a security and strategic move by the US, Japan, India, and Australia to balance the power of an ever-growing China (Choong, 2019; Hagström & Gustafsson, 2019; Koga, 2019; Lee & Lee, 2016; Medcalf, 2019; Pan, 2014; Tellis, 2020; Wei, 2022; Zhao, 2012). Wilkins and Kim (2022) state that the Indo-Pacific concept is an attempt by the United States and its close allies to establish a new geopolitical framework aligned with their own national interests and desired policies, as opposed to those of China.

Yet few have understood the Indo-Pacific as a strategic narrative. Barthwal-Datta and Chacko (2020) and Yeo (2023) are the only ones we know of to try so. Yeo explores how the Indo-Pacific narrative has shifted from Japan to the U.S., Barthwal-Datta & Chacko examine India and Australia’s respective strategic narratives of regional order in the Indo-Pacific. They show that although the discourse countries use around narrative looks quite similar in their terminology, they fundamentally differ in their substance. It is our goal to advance this debate.

Research design and the analytical framework

We build on Miskimmon et al.’s (2013, 2017) work. This literature links concepts from IR theory (esp. Nye’s concept of soft power) to concepts of strategic communication. They define narratives as a “*means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors.*” Strategic narratives serve as tools for political actors to increase influence by shaping interests and identities, understanding the dynamics of international relations, and predicting their future course. Political actors may use these for strategic purposes in policy making. Strategic narratives may structure the international system and even the expected behavior of its actors. Leaders may use the strategic narrative to filter identity discourses within a set of specific contextual limits (Miskimmon et al., 2013: 3-6, also Freedman, 2006).

Due to the rapidly changing nature of media ecology, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle argue that IR scholars have not fully integrated the communication of narratives into the broader theoretical debates about the order of the international system. Media ecologies empower and limit actors’ communication, so it is crucial to give them more attention in narrative research. Their books (Miskimmon et al., 2013, 2017; Roselle et al., 2014) contribute to remedying this gap by looking at strategic narratives theoretically and practically (Miskimmon et al., 2013: 1). They create a theoretical framework and methodology to locate the strategic narratives by focusing on their *formation, projection, and measuring their reception* (Miskimmon et al., 2017).

According to the authors, narratives are essentially stories which actor say about themselves and about others. The structure of the story includes basic components, creating a clear storyline with the main actors. The audience can understand the story and identify with it (Miskimmon et al., 2013). The components include actors, settings, conflict, resolution, and tools/behavior (Miskimmon et al., 2017: 7; Roselle et al., 2014: 74-77).

Narratives work at three different levels, all of which are connected. First, there are *International System Narratives*, which are used by states to create the preferred structure of the international system itself. They specify who the actors are, how the system works, and which actors challenge the system. For example, the authors mention the Cold War, the War on Terror, and the rise of China. The War on Terror narrative portrays states

protecting people from non-state entities labeled as terrorists in the name of security. Thus, the narrative can potentially restrict policymaking, particularly when a political actor is globally labeled as a terrorist by others (Roselle et al., 2014: 76).

The next level is *Issue Narratives*, by which actors influence the development of policies. Zhukova et al. say that an issue narrative is “a story of why a policy is needed... and how the policy will be implemented” (Zhukova et al., 2022: 201). Through this narrative, we understand the policy’s context, identify key players with an explanation of what the conflict or issue is, and determine how a specific course of action will resolve the underlying issue (Miskimmon et al., 2017: 8; Roselle et al., 2014: 76). Finally, there are *National Narratives* through which actors project their identity in international affairs, or in other words, how the nation “wants to be seen by others at home and abroad.” An example of a national narrative would be the US, a peace-loving nation committed to values like freedom and democracy. The state projects its values and goals through the narrative (Miskimmon et al., 2017: 8; Roselle et al., 2014: 76). It is crucial to recognize that strategic narratives are inseparably linked. Inconsistencies between narratives at different levels can weaken the effectiveness of strategic narratives related to policy (Miskimmon et al., 2017: 8).

METHODOLOGY AND DATA SELECTION

Methodologically, we build on qualitative content analysis of primary US and Japan discourse on the Indo-Pacific between 2016 and 2021. The primary data consists of policy documents, press releases, public speeches (by the president of the United States, the Prime Minister of Japan, and the highest representatives of each administration), meetings with officials, and diplomatic notes by the central authorities of the United States and Japan. The texts were published by the Japanese Government (KANTEI), the Japanese Foreign Ministry (MOFA), the Japanese Ministry of Defense, the official White House archives, the U.S. Department of State archives, and the U.S. Department of Defense.

In the case of Japan, obtaining documents was considerably easier than in the case of the United States. The MOFA has a special section on its official website called “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” where policy speeches, diplomatic bluebooks, and records of meetings with officials related to the Indo-Pacific policy can be found. The selection of documents on Kantei was made by keyword searches during Prime Minister Abe’s term (2016–2020), with search results containing “Indo-Pacific”, as in the case of the Department of Defense (DoD). Also, only documents in the English language were included. In sum, 32 texts were selected for the analysis.

In the case of the United States, obtaining documents was slightly more challenging as these official bodies do not have any thematic section on the Indo-Pacific. The selection of documents was made from the archived White House website, the archived content of the U.S. Department of State, and the National Security Council (NSC), covering Trump’s presidency from 2017–2021. These texts from the NSC were found on the archived White House website as well. In the archived White House website, 159 items were found with search results containing “Indo-Pacific.” In the U.S. Department of State, 1645 items were found with search results containing “Indo-Pacific.” In sum, 34 texts were selected for the analysis.

The information on the Indo-Pacific in the selected texts was coded for the three above mentioned strategic narrative categories: issue narrative, international system narrative, and national narrative. These categories were derived from a theory on strategic narratives; thus, it is a concept-driven, deductive method. We set subcategories for each type of strategic narrative to facilitate a more structured embedding of narrative elements. We operationalized the Indo-Pacific narrative by setting core questions that reflect the nature of the three strategic narrative types. This practice followed, to some extent, Zhukova et al.’s (2022) methodology, but our questions were different and case selection too. The questions were set as follows:

Table 1. Analytical Framework (Operationalization of Strategic Narratives)

Actors	Categories (Narrative Types)	Subcategories	Possible connecting questions to the Indo-Pacific strategic narrative	Narrative Elements (Coding units)
Japan and the United States (2016-2021)	Issue Narratives	Key Issues	<i>Why is the Indo-Pacific policy crucial? What are the threats and concerns?</i>	maritime security, counterterrorism & denuclearization
		Threats & Concerns		China's assertiveness, humanitarian crisis
	International System Narratives	Power Dynamics	<i>What is the approach to the international system in the Indo-Pacific?</i>	multilateralism, bilateralism
		Regional Positioning		ASEAN centrality, partnerships & alliances
		Perception of China		cooperation, competition
	National Narratives	Values and Goals	<i>What values and goals does the narrator project through the narrative?</i>	rule of law, market economy
Strategic objectives and priorities		connectivity, capacity building		

Source: Authors.

- Issue Narrative: *Why is the Indo-Pacific policy crucial? What are the threats and concerns?*
- International System Narrative: *What is the approach to the international system in the Indo-Pacific?*
- National Narrative: *What values and goals does the narrator project through the narrative?*

The issue narrative was operationalized into functional visions of security, the source of threats, and particular political issues, including maritime security, counterterrorism, denuclearization of China's assertiveness, and humanitarian crisis. The international system narrative was operationalized as structural visions of regional and global order, including multilateralism, bilateralism & ASEAN centrality, partnership, and alliances. The national narrative was operationalized as modes of national interest, including cooperation, competition & the rule of law, a market economy & connectivity, and capacity building.

Lacy et al. (2015) say that to limit the author's subjectivity, researchers should use several keywords that provide different facets of the same concept. The operationalization of each narrative into selected coding elements tries to reflect different facets of the subcategories in cases where this is applicable. By that, we relate the thesis's analytical framework to existing academic work on strategic narrative. The table on the analytical framework (operationalization of strategic narrative types) is presented below.

Given the theoretical part presented, it is expected that individual narratives will be omnipresent in the collected data. As Miskimmon et al. (2017) say, they are "*inextricably linked.*" To remedy this, we chose a scale of occurrence of given narrative terms. Building on existing methodological literature (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), we defined an analytical scale of content across the selected indicators. The scale takes ratings from 1 to 3, with 1 indicating the lowest occurrence and 3 indicating the highest occurrence, by counting the word occurrences within each category within the Indo-Pacific context.

- 1 (the lowest occurrence) → Issue Narrative
- 2 (the average occurrence) → National Narrative
- 3 (the highest occurrence) → International System Narrative

Japanese narrative of the Indo-Pacific

Abe initially sparked the Indo-Pacific debate in 2007. In Abe's inter-regnum, the interest in the Indo-Pacific weakened, but returned with Abe's election win in 2012, when he expressed his concern that China's growing presence in the South China Sea could transform the region into "*Lake Beijing*", and highlighted the key role of cooperation among four democratic countries in the region: the United States, Australia, India, and Japan. His

concerns were based on the fact that China was undergoing a transition from land-based power to maritime power (Abe, 2012).

The period between 2012 and 2016 saw increasing use of the term Indo-Pacific, that initially became interchangeable to the previous Asia-Pacific, but eventually a preferred one. In August 2016, Abe delivered a speech at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in Nairobi, mentioning a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) for the first time. Abe stressed the importance of international cooperation and highlighted that Japan:

“bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous” (MOFA, 2016).

Abe pursued three strategic goals through the FOIP: 1) Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade, 2) Pursuit of economic prosperity, e.g., improving connectivity and strengthening economic partnerships, and 3) Commitment to peace and stability, via capacity building on maritime law enforcement capabilities and assistance to countries in the Indo-Pacific region and cooperation in such fields as humanitarian assistance, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation (MOFA, 2016).

Abe's economic ambitions for the region have focused on prosperity and connectivity. The connectivity is to be achieved through infrastructure investment around the region (developing ports, railways, roads, energy and ICT), building on the Abe government's establishment of the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in 2015, which was an investment of approximately USD 110 billion for “quality infrastructure development” in Asia over the next 5 years. (Envall & Wilkins, 2023: 699).

Takenaka (2022) states that “FOIP is politically significant in terms of postwar Japanese diplomacy in that it combines economic policies as well as security policies into a comprehensive external policy for the first time in Japan's post-war history” (Takenaka 2022: 3). When it comes to Abe's motives for launching the concept, Takenaka (2022) states three driving factors that motivated the Abe administration: 1) China's rise and its launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2012 and 2013; 2) increasing tension in maritime space, including territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea; and 3) India's rise and its expected rapid economic growth.

Katsumata and Shibuichi (2023) argue that Japan, to some extent, supported Beijing's implementation of the BRI. They point out that Abe's willingness to cooperate with China started in May 2017 during the Leaders' Roundtable of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing. The authors state that this was also a reaction to the United States leaving the multilateral TPP at the beginning of the year. After that, Japan began to stress the compatibility of its FOIP concept with the Chinese initiative (Katsumata & Shibuichi, 2023: 309). By the end of 2018, Japan had stopped using the word “strategy” and begun to refer to FOIP as a “vision” on the grounds that “the Japanese Foreign Ministry learned during the August 2018 ASEAN meeting that the word “strategy” would be controversial in Southeast Asia” (Katsumata & Shibuichi, 2023; Yamamoto, 2021). Wirth and Jenne (2022) even argue that the Abe administration changed the term “strategy” to the “vision” because it sounds less military. Envall and Wilkins (2023) argue that Japan has been careful not to treat China as a competitor in the context of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative. To sum up, the Indo-Pacific vision in Japanese interpretation “adopts a nuanced and sophisticated approach by promoting principles, and not the specific issues that challenge such principles” (Choong, 2019: 416).

The United States narrative of the Indo-Pacific

The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ was officially introduced into the U.S. discourse during Obama's first administration. However, some authors, such as Calabrese (2020) and Tellis (2020), suggest that the idea of establishing a security

framework for the Indo-Pacific region traces back to the George W. Bush administration (2001–2009) as there was an evident shift in the Bush administration towards recognition India as a key partner in promoting stability in the Asia-Pacific region. During Obama's tenure (2009–2017), the 'Pivot to Asia' strategy was established to represent a strategic shift in U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle Eastern and towards the Asia-Pacific, recognizing its growing global importance (Kolmaš & Kolmašová, 2019; Scott, 2018; Yeo, 2023).

With the arrival of the Trump administration (2017–2021), it became clear that the new president wants to distance himself from his predecessor. President Trump made the immediate decision to pull the United States out of the TPP shortly after his inauguration in January 2017. Scott (2018) states that it reflected "*Trump's distrust of multilateral and state-led overseas economic initiatives,*" and thus, he began to foster bilateral and minilateral (trilaterals and quadrilaterals) initiatives and meetings (Scott, 2018: 28). However, there has arisen a need for a new approach to Asia that reflects American interests and needs. Yeo (2023) points out that "*Trump-appointed officials were searching for something new, but they didn't know exactly what other than it was a new approach to Asia*" (Yeo, 2023, p. 14).

In November 2017, Trump departed for a visit of Asian allies. It was considered the longest trip to Asia by any American president in more than a quarter-century. His mission focused on three goals: 1) strengthening international resolve to denuclearize North Korea, 2) promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and 3) advancing American prosperity through fair and reciprocal trade (Trump, 2017). The most significant stop was his visit to Vietnam, where Trump delivered a speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. He did not mention "Asia-Pacific" once despite this being the APEC summit. Even though Trump announced he was always going to put America first, stressing the bilateral agreements and warning about China-first trade policies, he also shared a vision "*for a free and open Indo-Pacific*" as "*a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace.*" Overall, he stressed the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation, including open shipping lanes, referring to the "Indo-Pacific" 10 times (Trump, 2017).

The final commitment to the Indo-Pacific region was indicated by adopting the United States' National Security Strategy, released in December 2017 with a specific part on the Indo-Pacific. After almost a year of signals in office, the Trump administration was presenting a clear vision for the United States' engagement in the region. Right from the opening, a clear reference to the competition with China is mentioned:

"A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region." (NSS 2017)

In June 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo clarified the geographical scope of the Indo-Pacific strategy, defining the region as stretching from the west coast of the United States to the west coast of India. In mid-2018, the United States also renamed its largest military command, the US Pacific Command, to the US Indo-Pacific Command to highlight its new approach to Asia (Pardesi, 2020: 124). The renaming was not only symbolic but, according to Pardesi, sent a hidden message to India, namely that India "*is rising in only one world region that is covered by one single American military command.*" By reinforcing India's position, the United States aimed to shift the focus away from China by de-centering China's position (Pardesi, 2020: 139-140).

In general, President Trump sought a fresh approach to Asia, one that would effectively diverge from the policy trajectory established under his predecessor's "Pivot to Asia." At the same time, Trump had not given up on successful initiatives that were established during the Obama administration. He adopted Obama's geographical demarcation of the Indo-Pacific. Trump's strategy has been similarly committed to economic and security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, promoting free markets, rule of law, and sovereignty for all while seeking to counterbalance China's influence. The inspiration from the Japanese FOIP strategy is palpable. So, we conclude this

part with the statement that “*Washington has been a follower, not a leader, in lifting an Indo-Pacific banner*” (Medcalf, 2019: 89).

ANALYSING THE NARRATIVES

Coding the corpus of selected primary data (Table 2), we find that, in short, the International System Narrative is the most represented in Japan, followed by the National Narrative and ending with the Issue Narrative. In the United States, the most dominant is the National Narrative, followed by the International System Narrative and ending with the Issue Narrative. However, before we can answer the research questions based on the provided results, each narrative will be discussed in more detail. We focus on each narrative type, and within it, we look at the different focus areas within which the states in question project their narratives. The result will be thematically presented, beginning with issue narratives, followed by international system narratives, and ending with national narratives. Then, we harness the findings from each narrative to answer the second research question of whether Tokyo and Washington share common goals and motivations in shaping the strategic narrative of the Indo-Pacific.

Tables 3 and 4 show the individual texts in each administration and the results of the content analysis. Each text is thus assigned a degree of occurrence of the narrative type—issue narrative, international system narrative, and national narrative.

Issue Strategic Narrative

Issue narrative is “*a story of why a policy is needed... and how the policy will be implemented*” (Zhukova et al., 2022: 201). Although the issue narrative is not the most emphasized narrative type in Japan nor the United States, we can identify significant issues states are concerned about regarding the Indo-Pacific. In the case of Abe’s administration, we could observe a certain level of cautiousness when addressing specific threats through the Indo-Pacific narrative, be it China’s assertiveness, denuclearization, or counterterrorism. This is even though these particular issues (except China’s assertiveness) are highlighted as the main strategic goals of the FOIP strategy (MOFA, 2016). The most significant issue Japan proposes through the narrative is, therefore, maritime security, as it appears most of the time in the dataset within the issue narrative category. Putting emphasis on this concrete issue can be traced back to Abe’s *Confluence of the Two Seas* speech in 2007, to highlighting it in the QUAD cooperation in 2012, and to the FOIP strategy launched in 2016. Thus, the result of the analysis only confirms that the Abe administration has been consistent in this regard.

*“Taking into account the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” the participants..., shared their recognition regarding the importance of **the rule of law** in the seas, and ... support for **capacity building** in the area of **maritime security**, ..., etc.”* (MOFA, 2018)

Nor is it surprising that through the analysis, we found essentially no mention of China’s assertiveness, as Abe stressed the compatibility of its FOIP concept with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. References that would closely refer to this were mostly of type: “*The two leaders (Japan and New Zealand) also exchanged views regarding **other regional situations**, including **the East and South China Seas**.*” (September 19, 2019) However, such references were not included in the results, firstly because of the different wording of the coding unit and mainly because they were never even part of a paragraph discussing the Indo-Pacific.

On the other hand, the Trump administration has far more often mentioned these issues and threats directly through the Indo-Pacific narrative. In the case of the United States, the issue narrative is dominated by references to counterterrorism and denuclearization.

Table 2. Formation and Projection of the Strategic Narrative of the Indo-Pacific

Country	Government Communication					
	Policy Documents	Press Releases	Policy Speeches	Meetings with officials	Dip Notes	Total Texts
Japan the	6	0	12	14	0	32
United States	4	18	10	0	2	34
All	10	18	22	14	2	66

Source: Authors.

Table 3. Formation and Projection of Strategic Narrative of the Indo-Pacific in Japan

No.	Administration	Date	Government Communication	Issue Narrative	International System Narrative	National Narrative
1	Abe	August 27, 2016	Policy Speeches	1	2	2
2	Abe	January 22, 2018	Policy Speeches	1	2	3
3	Abe	January 22, 2018	Policy Speeches	0	0	1
4	Abe	May 19, 2018	Meetings with officials	1	2	2
5	Abe	September 25, 2018	Policy Speeches	2	1	2
6	Abe	October 9, 2018	Meetings with officials	0	0	0
7	Abe	October 29, 2018	Meetings with officials	0	1	0
8	Abe	November 13, 2018	Meetings with officials	1	0	1
9	Abe	November 16, 2018	Meetings with officials	0	2	0
10	Abe	January 10, 2019	Meetings with officials	1	1	0
11	Abe	January 28, 2019	Policy Speeches	2	1	3
12	Abe	January 28, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	0	0
13	Abe	February 2, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	1	0
14	Abe	April 24, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	1	0
15	Abe	April 25, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	0	0
16	Abe	May 27, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	3	2
17	Abe	June 26, 2019	Meetings with officials	1	1	1
18	Abe	August 5, 2019	Policy Speeches	2	3	2
19	Abe	August 24, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	2	0
20	Abe	September 19, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	2	0
21	Abe	September 27, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	0	3
22	Abe	November 4, 2019	Meetings with officials	0	0	0
23	Abe	December 2, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	0	0
24	Abe	January 10, 2020	Policy Speeches	1	2	2
25	Abe	January 20, 2020	Policy Speeches	1	1	1
26	Abe	January 20, 2020	Policy Speeches	0	1	0
27	Abe	January 1, 2017	Policy Documents	0	2	3
28	Abe	January 1, 2018	Policy Documents	1	2	3
29	Abe	January 1, 2019	Policy Documents	1	3	2
30	Abe	January 1, 2020	Policy Documents	1	3	2
31	Abe	January 1, 2021	Policy Documents	1	3	2
32	Abe	January 1, 2021	Policy Documents	1	3	2

Source: Authors.

Table 4. Formation and Projection of Strategic Narrative of the Indo-Pacific in the United States

No.	Administration	Date	Government Communication	Issue Narrative	International System Narrative	National Narrative
1	Trump	April 22, 2017	Policy Speeches	0	0	1
2	Trump	September 1, 2017	DIPNOTE	0	2	1
3	Trump	November 2, 2017	Policy Speeches	1	2	3
4	Trump	November 10, 2017	Policy Speeches	1	3	2
5	Trump	November 15, 2017	Policy Speeches	2	3	1
6	Trump	December 17, 2017	Policy Documents	2	2	3
7	Trump	December 19, 2017	Policy Documents	0	0	1
8	Trump	January 8, 2018	DIPNOTE	3	2	1
9	Trump	April 2, 2018	Press Releases	0	2	3
10	Trump	April 18, 2018	Policy Speeches	0	2	1
11	Trump	July 30, 2018	Press Releases	0	1	3
12	Trump	August 4, 2018	Press Releases	1	0	2
13	Trump	September 28, 2018	Press Releases	2	1	2
14	Trump	October 4, 2018	Policy Speeches	1	2	2
15	Trump	November 18, 2018	Press Releases	3	1	2
16	Trump	January 20, 2019	Press Releases	0	1	1
17	Trump	April 26, 2019	Press Releases	2	1	0
18	Trump	May 27, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	0	0
19	Trump	June 28, 2019	Press Releases	0	1	0
20	Trump	June 28, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	0	0
21	Trump	June 30, 2019	Press Releases	2	0	0
22	Trump	July 2, 2019	Press Releases	0	1	1
23	Trump	September 12, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	1	2
24	Trump	September 20, 2019	Press Releases	0	0	0
25	Trump	November 4, 2019	Policy Documents	1	2	3
26	Trump	November 25, 2019	Policy Speeches	0	0	2
27	Trump	January 7, 2020	Press Releases	0	2	1
28	Trump	February 25, 2020	Press Releases	2	0	0
29	Trump	October 1, 2020	Press Releases	1	2	3
30	Trump	October 23, 2020	Press Releases	1	0	2
31	Trump	September 16, 2020	Press Releases	0	0	0
32	Trump	November 20, 2020	Press Releases	0	0	1
33	Trump	December 3, 2020	Press Releases	3	0	0
34	Trump	January 12, 2021	Policy Documents	2	1	3

Source: Authors.

*“We remain ready to respond with overwhelming force to North Korean aggression and will improve options to compel **denuclearization** of the peninsula.”* (December 17, 2017) or *“President Trump and Prime Minister Modi are calling on other countries in the region (Indo-Pacific) to take steps to **counterterrorism**.”* (The White House, 2020)

Despite the United States being far more direct in addressing threats in its official communication than Japan,

“China’s assertiveness” was almost absent from the documents. However, we cannot overlook other statements that depict a similar reality.

*“Across much of the Indo-Pacific region, the **Chinese Communist Party (CCP)** is using military and economic **coercion to bully its neighbors**, advance unlawful maritime claims, threaten maritime shipping lanes, and destabilize territory along the periphery of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).” (MOFA, 2020)*

There are certain limitations, which have already been mentioned above. The narrative elements do not cover every issue the actors promote through the Indo-Pacific narrative. However, based on the theoretical framework of strategic narratives, issues should be related to some threats or concerns that states have, thus shaping the strategic narrative, which is not the case for infrastructure, energy, or digital issues, which were also often mentioned. The humanitarian crisis element was hardly present in the texts, but it could have probably overlapped with natural disasters. Their number would slightly increase but would not change the final results.

International System Strategic Narrative

International System Narrative is used by states to create the preferred structure of the international system (Miskimmon et al., 2013). Zhukova et al. (2022) add that states create a desirable vision of the world along with its problems. By analyzing structural visions of regional and global order, including multilateralism, bilateralism, ASEAN centrality, partnership, and alliances, the thesis concluded that the international system narrative is the most prominent narrative in Japan’s governmental communication, dominated by references to partnerships, ASEAN centrality, and multilateralism.

The article worked from the beginning with the argument that Tokyo’s strategic narrative encapsulates its vision of a viable *regional order*. Upon closer examination of regional positioning and power dynamics, the qualitative content analysis confirmed this. The high occurrence of these coding units was especially visible in policy documents.

*“Seizing every opportunity of **bilateral** and **multilateral** dialogues, including the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. meetings, Japan will advance coordination and cooperation with the U.S., Australia, India and ASEAN as well as countries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.” (MOFA, 2021)*

However, surprisingly, the international system narrative was not always the strongest one in analyzed texts. Since the beginning of our timeframe (2016-2020), the national narrative has been more prevalent in official texts, mostly emphasizing the values that Japan projects to the Indo-Pacific. It only reaffirmed that the types of narratives overlap and are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. However, since 2019, there has been more emphasis on international cooperation within established alliances, which can only underscore the deteriorating situation with China over the territorial disputes (Diplomat 2020). Another factor that could influence a slight shift toward the International System Narrative type was the adoption of the ASEAN Outlook of the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in June 2019, reinforcing the ASEAN-centered rules-based regional architecture and stressing inclusiveness, economic cooperation, and connectivity. Koga (2022) states that an ASEAN-centered regional architecture serves to negate any attempts to create an exclusive sphere of influence in the region (Koga, 2022: 161).

The Trump administration, to the contrary, pursued partnerships and alliances through the Indo-Pacific narrative; the emphasis on multilateral relationships was basically absent. This makes sense since America pulled out of the TPP shortly after Trump took office. Thus, Washington put a lot of emphasis on bilateral cooperation under the Indo-Pacific banner.

*“Since taking office, President Trump has placed 43 calls to Indo-Pacific leaders and conducted **bilateral** meetings with Japan, South Korea, China, India, Australia...” or “We will pursue **bilateral** trade agreements on a fair and reciprocal basis.” (NSS, 2017)*

National Narrative

Miskimmon et al. (2013, 2017) explain that the national narrative is how the nation “wants to be seen by others at home and abroad.” By analyzing modes of national interest, including cooperation, competition, the rule of law, a market economy and connectivity, and capacity building, the thesis concluded that the national narrative is the most prominent in the United States governmental communication, dominated by references to a market economy.

Washington has clearly prioritized this narrative in its discourse. The focus on the “economic pillar” of the Indo-Pacific strategy in the Trump administration clearly advances American prosperity through fair and reciprocal trade and connects the strategy with the American first policy. Palit and Sano (2018) state that US investments primarily aim to improve access to markets for US exports in the Indo-Pacific region. Trump’s presentation of the FOIP strategy at several significant business gatherings, especially in November 2017 and July 2018, clearly demonstrates its importance in terms of trade and economics. Also, several references to unfair trade practices were made. Pant and Parpiani (2020) add that the Trump administration continued a confrontational posture against China, stating the example of the 2018 round of tariffs to negotiate more fair and open trade for the United States. Such as when Trump noted:

*“The initiative (FOIP) will grow foreign energy markets and boost U.S. energy exports by expanding public-private partnerships, fostering business-to-business connections, and helping partner governments set **market economy**-based energy policies.” (US Department of State, 2018)*

The national narrative also implies criticism of China, with the United States seeing China as a competitor in the Indo-Pacific region. The competition aspect is evident in US discourse from the first sentence of the National Security Strategy.

*A geopolitical **competition** between free and **repressive visions of world order** is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. (NSS, 2017)*

In the case of Japan, the FOIP is also interpreted in the academic literature as a concept that aims to counterbalance China’s influence, yet Japan nearly does not mention China through the Indo-Pacific narrative. Envall and Wilkins (2023) have shown that Japan has been careful not to treat China as a competitor in the context of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative, which has been confirmed in our research. In addition, it is also necessary to point out the change in terminology, where Japan has stopped using the word *strategy* with FOIP but replaced it with *vision*, again to avoid China feeling threatened.

Our results show that Japan attempted to create a national narrative that is acceptable to the widest possible audience so that other countries in the Indo-Pacific region are not afraid to adopt the concept while at the same time not worsening their own relations with China, as many countries seem to be hesitant taking sides between Washington and Beijing. Instead, in Tokyo’s Indo-Pacific national narrative, the focus on connectivity and capacity-building is highly emphasized. Japanese companies are involved in a wide range of “hard” projects, such as electricity, ports, railways, and urban development, as well as in soft aspects, such as technological and operational expertise. Maritime law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness are often mentioned in connection with capacity building. Japan emphasizes that these activities strengthen the rule-based international order.

*“Of course, it goes without saying that in order to make the **connectivity** linking Japan and Europe something rock-solid, the Indo-Pacific, the sea route that leads to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, must be free and open.” (MOFA, 2019a)*

*“Collaborating on various international workshops and similar activities in the digital and cybersecurity sector which promote **capacity building** of countries in the Indo-Pacific region.” (MOFA, 2019b)*

Also, we have seen the similarities in values. This is not surprising, given that both countries are democratic and promote similar values such as “rules-based order” and the “rule of law.” However, even though each of their respective narratives promotes a “free” and “open” Indo-Pacific, in the United States, the values “free” and “open” are more economically driven than in Japan, where they occur more in connection with rules-based order and the freedom of navigation.

Discussion: The Strategic Narrative of the Indo-Pacific: One or Two Legacies?

So, is there a single or diverging legacy of each leader’s discourse on the Indo-Pacific? The revealed alignments and divergences between Japan and the United States in approaching their respective strategic narrative types of the Indo-Pacific indicate that Abe and Trump started two different legacies.

An “Indo-Pacific” narrative establishes both Japan and the United States as two key players in a strategically and economically significant region. The specific use of Indo-Pacific terminology by strategic elites at home and abroad constitutes “*a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors*” (Miskimmon et al., 2013: 3), including key actors, issues or threats, values, and goals, regional dynamic and positioning, strategic objectives and priorities, and desirable outcomes – and that illuminate Japan and the United States’ different conception of the Indo-Pacific and how they want to shape the future of the Indo-Pacific.

Tokyo does not project specific issues through the Indo-Pacific strategic narrative but rather offers a value framework and principles through which it seeks to engage as many actors as possible, mainly based on the principle of maritime security. On the other hand, Washington actively promotes security policies through the Indo-Pacific narrative, e.g., denuclearization of the Korean peninsula or taking steps to counterterrorism in the region. This helps to explain, for example, why Japan has not joined the United States to challenge China with freedom of navigation operations in the SCS (Sato, 2019: 114).

Through the international system narrative, we can understand the regional dynamic, positioning, and overall approach to the International System in the Indo-Pacific. While both Japan and the United States prioritize partnerships and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s narrative leans more towards multilateralism and ASEAN centrality, while the United States emphasizes bilateral relationships and alliances. This helps to explain Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was explained by other countries taking advantage of America and overall opposition to multilateral free trade agreements.

While each country emphasizes the elements of *free* and *open* that fit its agenda and its domestic and international image, Washington seeks economic gain and Tokyo freedom of navigation. The analysis also showed that Japan’s and the United States’ perceptions of China through the strategic narrative of the Indo-Pacific differ. While the US tends to exclude China, portraying it as a competitor of the free and open system, Japan’s strategy is closer to hedging. Its approach is characterized by careful terminology use to avoid provoking China and maintain broad regional acceptance. This helps to explain, for example, Japan’s wariness around using the word *strategy* with FOIP and changing it to the word *vision*. The alignments of both countries in the national narrative are aimed at improving the capacity building and connectivity of Indo-Pacific countries.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, examining the formation and projection of the Indo-Pacific strategic narrative through the cases of the United States and Japan by analyzing their government communication has provided valuable insights into the strategic considerations and motivations of these two key actors in the region.

Although the United States has often been associated with pioneering the Indo-Pacific concept, the formation of the narrative emerged in Japan a decade earlier. The famous speech by Prime Minister Abe, *Confluence of the Two Seas* formed a compelling narrative that captured the values and principles of a diverse and inclusive region. The roots of this story were a decade later projected to the national strategy, later vision, of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The use of specific Indo-Pacific terminology by strategic elites in the Trump administration adopted the already existing narrative to the United States, where the new President wanted to depart from Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy to something new that would partially build on the Obama administration but also underscore his America First policy. Where Obama failed to connect the narrative to the economic benefits on the home front, Trump put the America First policy in place, stressing the economic advantages for the US and the national interest of being engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. This helps to explain, for example, the gradual disappearance of the term Asia-Pacific from the official US discourse. The FOIP strategy was launched at the end of 2017, and it largely followed its Japanese predecessor.

Our findings demonstrate that while Washington's narrative corresponds to its underlying *national interest*, Tokyo's narrative encapsulates its vision of a viable *regional order*. In proving the thesis arguments correct, it was found that each country emphasizes the elements of the Indo-Pacific narrative that fit its agenda and its domestic and international image. The distinctions in each narrative type coincide with this argument as the international system narrative is the most prominent in Japan and the national narrative in the United States. As was revealed by the results, although both actors promote a "rule-based," "free," and "open" Indo-Pacific based on the "rule of law", these convergences are driven by divergent factors. While Washington stresses the FOIP's importance in terms of trade and economics, emphasizing the market economy in official governmental communication, Tokyo's most articulated narrative elements are connected to the regional order. Their respective narratives of the Indo-Pacific are related to strategic considerations.

Despite these differences, both countries share concerns about China's activities in the region. While many authors perceive the Indo-Pacific concept mainly as a security and strategic move by the US, Japan, India, and Australia to balance the power of an ever-growing China, there are certain distinctions between Japan and the United States as well, evidenced by the thesis's findings. Although both countries share the concern of a rising China, Tokyo does not seem to project these concerns through the narrative as it only promotes quite indirect criticism of Chinese actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea. On the other hand, Washington openly shares its concerns about China's activities and, through the narrative, links them to threats to national interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This also explains why the Trump administration presents the values of *free* and *open* more specifically than Japan, openly accusing China of unfair trade practices and of coercion of other nations. Also, Japan's emphasis on multilateral rules, values, and principles rather than specific policies within the Indo-Pacific narrative, stressing the importance of ASEAN Centrality, is more indicative of an approach that is more inclusive of China than in the case of the United States.

Trying to understand the Indo-Pacific through the prism of the strategic narrative has proven to be a useful way to gain a more comprehensive understanding of strategic narratives to help states promote their preferred conceptions of regional order. Furthermore, by analyzing Abe's and Trump's governmental communication through qualitative content analysis, the article was able to draw meaningful insights into states' drivers and motivations in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific. Moving forward, it will be interesting to examine how the Kishida and

Biden administrations navigate the Indo-Pacific landscape and whether they continue to follow the *legacies* of their predecessors in shaping the region's future. This opens avenues for further research to explore the evolving dynamics of the Indo-Pacific strategic narrative and its implications for regional stability and cooperation..

Acknowledgment

This text is a revised and shortened version of Kristýna Švárová's MA dissertation written at the Institute of Political Science, Charles University in the Czech Republic.

REFERENCES

- Abe, S. (2007, August 23). Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe "Confluence of the Two Seas." *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*. Retrieved March 9, 2024 from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.
- Abe, S. (2012, December 27). Asia's democratic security diamond. *Project Syndicate*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe>.
- Barthwal-Datta, M., & Chacko, P. (2020). The politics of strategic narratives of regional order in the Indo-Pacific: Free, open, prosperous, inclusive?. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 74(3), 244-263.
- Calabrese, J. (2020). Assuring a free and open Indo-Pacific – Rebalancing the US approach. *Asian Affairs*, 51(2), 307-327.
- Choong, W. (2019). The return of the Indo-Pacific strategy: An assessment. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 73(5), 415-430.
- Envall, H. D. P., & Wilkins, T. S. (2023). Japan and the new Indo-Pacific order: The rise of an entrepreneurial power. *The Pacific Review*, 36(4), 691-722.
- Freedman, L. (2006). Networks, culture and narratives. *The Adelphi Papers*, 45(379), 11-26.
- Hagström, L., & Gustafsson, K. (2019). Narrative power: How storytelling shapes East Asian international politics. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(4), 387-406.
- Hsieh, H-F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), 1277-1288.
- Katsumata, H., & Shibuichi, D. (2023). Japan in the Indo-Pacific: Domestic politics and foreign policy. In K. He & H. Feng (Eds.), *Navigating international order transition in the Indo-Pacific* (pp. 79-102). London: Routledge.
- Kireeva, A. A. (2020). The Indo-Pacific in the strategies of the U.S. and Japan. *Russia in Global Affairs*, 18(3), 98-127.
- KOGA, K. (2019). Japan: Coming Up with The Indo-Pacific Concept. Infrastructure, Ideas, And Strategy in The Indo-Pacific. *Asia Studies Centre*, 20-25.
- Koga, K. (2022). Getting ASEAN right in US Indo-Pacific strategy. *The Washington Quarterly*, 45(4), 157-177. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2149952>.
- Kolmaš, M., & Kolmašová, Š. (2019). A 'pivot' that never existed: America's Asian strategy under Obama and Trump. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 32(1), 61-79.
- Kolmaš, M., Qiao-Franco, G., & Karmazin, A. (2023). Understanding region formation through proximity, interests, and identity: Debunking the Indo-Pacific as a viable regional demarcation. *The Pacific Review*, online first. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2300976>
- Lacy, S., Watson, B. R., Riffe, D., & Lovejoy, J. (2015). Issues and best practices in content analysis. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 92(4), 791-811.
- Lee, L., & Lee, J. (2016). Japan-India cooperation and Abe's democratic security diamond: Possibilities, limitations and the view from Southeast Asia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 38(2), 284-308.
- Li, H. (2022). The "Indo-Pacific": Intellectual origins and international visions in global contexts. *Modern Intellectual History*, 19(3), 807-833.
- Medcalf, R. (2019). Indo-Pacific visions: Giving solidarity a chance. *Asia Policy*, 14(3), 79-96.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). (2016). *Free and Open Indo-Pacific*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000430632.pdf>.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). (2018, May 19). *The Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM8) (Overview of Results)*.

- Retrieved April 28, 2024 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/page3e_000900.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). (2019a, September 19). *Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/nz/page4e_001092.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). (2019b, May 27). *Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_001022.html#section5.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). (2020, December 2). *Foreign policy speech by foreign minister Motegi Toshimitsu on the occasion of The 1st Tokyo Global Dialogue (provisional translation)*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page3e_001133.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) (2021). *Diplomatic Bluebook 2021*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/pdf/en_index.html.
- Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2013). *Strategic narratives: Communication power and the new world order*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2017). Introduction. In A. Miskimmon, B. O'Loughlin, & L. Roselle (Eds.), *Forging the world: Strategic narratives and international relations* (pp. 2-22). Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press.
- National Security Strategy of the United States of America. (2017, December 1). *Trump White House Archives*. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- Palit, A., & Sano, S. (2018, December 4). *The United States' free and open Indo-Pacific strategy: Challenges for India and Japan*. Institute for South Asian Studies. Retrieved March 26, 2024, from <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ISAS-Insights-No.-524-The-United-States-Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>.
- Pan, C. (2014). The 'Indo-Pacific' and geopolitical anxieties about China's rise in the Asian regional order. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(4), 453-469.
- Pant, H. V., & Parpiani, K. (2020). *US engagement in the Indo-Pacific: An assessment of the Trump era*. Retrieved April 29, 2024 from <https://www.orfonline.org/research/us-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific-an-assessment-of-the-trump-era>.
- Pardesi, M. S. (2020). The Indo-Pacific: A 'new' region or the return of history?. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 74(2), 124-146.
- Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A., & O'Loughlin, B. (2014). Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power. *Media, War & Conflict*, 7(1), 70-84.
- Scott, D. (2018). The Indo-Pacific in US strategy: Responding to power shifts. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 3(2), 19-43. Retrieved March 27, 2024 from <https://rpquarterly.kureselcalismalar.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/vol3.2-scott.pdf>.
- Sato, Y. (2019). Japan's Indo-Pacific Strategy: The Old Geography and the New Strategic Reality. *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, 2(4), 107-119.
- Takenaka, H. (2022). Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" vision: Strategic vision and domestic political institutions. *Project for Peaceful Competition*. Retrieved March 24, 2024 from <https://www.peaceful-competition.org/pub/4dh4z909>.
- Tellis, A. J. (2020). Waylaid by contradictions: Evaluating Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy. *The Washington Quarterly*, 43(4), 123-154.
- The White House. (2017, November 10). *Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit | Da Nang, Vietnam*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>.
- The White House. (2017, November 15). *Remarks by President Trump on His Trip to Asia*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-trip-asia/>.
- The White House. (2020, February 25). *President Donald J. Trump is strengthening our strategic partnership with India*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-strategic-partnership-india/>.
- US Department of State. (2018, July 30). *Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific*. Retrieved April 28, 2024 from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.
- Wei, Z. (2022). The evolution of the 'QUAD': Driving forces, impacts, and prospects. *China International Strategy Review*, 4, 288-304.
- Wilkins, T., & Kim, J. (2022). Adoption, accommodation or opposition? - Regional powers respond to American-led Indo-Pacific strategy. *The Pacific Review*, 35(3), 415-445.
- Wirth, C., & Jenne, N. (2022). Filling the void: The Asia-Pacific problem of order and emerging Indo-Pacific regional multilateralism. *Contemporary*

Security Policy, 43(2), 213-242.

- Wu, Y-S. (2022). Beyond 'Indo-Pacific' as a buzzword: Learning from China's BRI experience. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 29(1), 1-22.
- Yamamoto, R. (2020). Understanding Abe's free and open Indo-Pacific vision through Japan's development assistance. *Issues & Insights*, 20(1), 7-11.
- Yeo, A., (2023, March). *Narratives of grand strategy in Asia: From the Asia pivot to a free and open Indo-Pacific*. Paper presented at International Studies Association 2023 Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada.
- Zhao, S. (2012). Shaping the regional context of China's rise: How the Obama administration brought back hedge in its engagement with China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21(75), 369-389.
- Zhukova, E., Sundström, M. R., & Elgström, O. (2022). Feminist Foreign Policies (FFPs) as strategic narratives: Norm translation in Sweden, Canada, France, and Mexico. *Review of International Studies*, 48(1), 195-216.

Appendix. Primary sources for the content analysis

Primary Sources of Japan:

- *Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leaders' Meeting*. Prime Minister's Office of Japan. (2006, November 20). Available from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/abespeech/2006/11/20press_e.html. [cit. 2024-03-09].
- *Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe "Confluence of the Two Seas."* Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007, August 23). Available from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.
- *When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an "Inland Sea": Five Pledges to a Future Asia that "Acts Together," Speech by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan - "The World and Japan"* Database. (2008, May 22). Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/exdpm/20080522.S1E.html>.
- *Japan's Diplomacy: Ensuring Security and Prosperity Speech by H.E. Mr. Taro Aso, Prime Minister of Japan* (Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister Taro Aso). (2009, June 30). https://japan.kantei.go.jp/asospeech/2009/06/30speech_e.html.
- *Speech by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama, Prime Minister of Japan, on the Occasion of the Sixteenth International Conference on the Future of Asia Hosted by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama). (2010, May 20). Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. Retrieved April 29, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/201005/20speech_e.html.
- *Press Conference by Prime Minister Naoto Kan Following His Visit to the United States* (Speeches and Statements by Prime Minister Naoto Kan). (2010, September 24). Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201009/24un_naigai_e.html.
- *Japan is Back By Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan 22, February, 2013 at CSIS*. (2013, February 22). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html.
- *Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)*. (2016, August 27). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 27, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html.
- *Diplomatic Bluebook 2017*. (2017, January 1). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf03>.
- *Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Kono to the 196th Session of the Diet*. (2018, January 22). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 27, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_000816.html.
- *Diplomatic Bluebook 2018*. (2018, January 1). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2018/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf01>.
- *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the Diet (Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister) | Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*. (2018, January 22). Retrieved April 27, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201801/_00002.html.
- *The Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM8) (Overview of Results)*. (2018, May 19). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/page3e_000900.html.
- *Address by Prime Minister Abe at the Seventy-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. (2018, September 25). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_000926.html.
- *The Tenth Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting*. (2018, October 9). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/page4e_000923.html.
- *Japan-India Summit Meeting*. (2018, October 29). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3_002603.html.
- *Vice President of the United States Visits Japan*. (2018, November 13). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page3e_000965.html.
- *Japan-Australia Summit Meeting*. (2018, November 16). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/au/page3e_000964.html.
- *Diplomatic Bluebook 2019*. (2019, January 1). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2019/html/chapter1/c0102.html#sf01>.
- *Lunch Meeting Hosted by Prime Minister May of the United Kingdom and Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting*. (2019, January 10). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/gb/page6e_000165.html.

- *Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Kono to the 198th Session of the Diet*. (2019, January 28). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page3e_000987.html.
- *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 198th Session of the Diet (Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister) | Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*. (2019, January 28). Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201801/_00003.html.
- *Japan-Germany Summit Meeting*. (2019, January 4). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/c_see/page6e_000166.html.
- *Japan-Italy Summit Meeting*. (2019, April 24). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/it/page4e_001014.html.
- *The 26th Japan-EU Summit*. (2019, April 25). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page6e_000178.html.
- *Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting*. (2019, May 27). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_001022.html#section5.
- *Japan-France Summit Meeting*. (2019, June 26). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/fr/page4e_001052.html.
- *Three Pillars for We the People of the Pacific to Build an Active, Opportunity-filled and Innovative (AOI) Future*. (2019, August 5). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000504747.pdf>.
- *Japan-Canada Summit Meeting*. (2019, August 24). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/ca/page3_002867.html.
- *Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting*. (2019, September 19). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/nz/page4e_001092.html.
- *“Japan and the EU: The Strong and Steady Pillars Supporting Many Bridges” – Keynote Speech by the Prime Minister at the Europa Connectivity Forum (Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister) | Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*. (2019, September 27). Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201909/_00003.html.
- *The 11th Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting*. (2019, November 4). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/page3e_001125.html.
- *Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu on the occasion of The 1st Tokyo Global Dialogue (provisional translation)*. (2019, December 2). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page3e_001133.html.
- *Diplomatic Bluebook 2020*. (2020, January 1). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100116875.pdf>.
- *ASEAN Policy Speech by Foreign Minister MOTEGI Toshimitsu*. (2020, January 10). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/page3e_001148.html.
- *Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister MOTEGI to the 201st Session of the Diet*. (2020, January 20). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/pp/page3e_001153.html.
- *Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 201st Session of the Diet (Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister) | Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*. (2020, January 20). Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/202001/_00004.html.
- *Diplomatic Bluebook 2021*. (2021, January 1). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/pdf/en_index.html.
- *Free and Open Indo-Pacific*. (2021, January 1). Japan Ministry of Defense. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/india_pacific/indo_pacific_e_2021.pdf.

Primary Sources of the United States:

- Hagel Lauds U.S.-Australia Force Posture Agreement. (n.d.). U.S. Department of Defense. <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/603058/hagel-lauds-us-australia-force-posture-agreement/>
- Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. United States Trade Representative. (n.d.). <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/October/summary-trans-pacific-partnership>
- US engagement in the Indo-Pacific: An assessment of the Trump era. (n.d.). orfonline.org. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/us-engagement-in-the-indo-pacific-an-assessment-of-the-trump-era>
- *Remarks by the Vice President and Australian Prime Minister Turnbull at a Press Conference – The White House.* (2017, April 22). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-australian-prime-minister-turnbull-press-conference/>
- *Highlighting Partnerships and Shared Goals at 2017 Indian Ocean Conference - United States Department of State.* (2017, September 1). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/highlighting-partnerships-and-shared-goals-at-2017-indian-ocean-conference/>.
- Secretary Mattis Joint Press Conference with Minister of Defense Nirma. (n.d.). U.S. Department of Defense (2017, September 26). <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1325283/secretary-mattis-joint-press-conference-with-minister-of-defence-nirmala-sithar/>
- *Press Briefing by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster – The White House.* (2017, November 2). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/press-briefing-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-110217/>
- *Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit | Da Nang, Vietnam – The White House.* (2017, November 10). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>
- *Remarks by President Trump on His Trip to Asia – The White House.* (2017, November 15). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-trip-asia/>
- *National Security Strategy of the United States of America.* (2017, December 1). Trump White House Archives. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- *President Donald J. Trump's First Year of Foreign Policy Accomplishments – The White House.* (2017, December 19). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-first-year-of-foreign-policy-accomplishments/>
- *Strengthening U.S. Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific for a More Secure and Prosperous Future - United States Department of State.* (2018, January 8). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/strengthening-u-s-partnerships-in-the-indo-pacific-for-a-more-secure-and-prosperous-future/>
- *Defining Our Relationship with India for the Next Century: An Address by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.* (2018, February 7). <https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-our-relationship-india-next-century-address-us-secretary-state-rex-tillerson>
- *Briefing on The Indo-Pacific Strategy - United States Department of State.* (2018, April 2). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/briefing-on-the-indo-pacific-strategy/index.html>.
- *Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference – The White House.* (2018, April 18). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-conference/>
- *Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific - United States Department of State.* (2018, July 30). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/advancing-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>.
- *U.S. Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region - United States Department of State.* (2018, August 4). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific-region/index.html>.
- *President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Are Working Together to Maintain a Free and Open Indo-Pacific – The White House.* (2018, September 28). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-are-working-together-to-maintain-a-free-and-open-indo-pacific/>
- *Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration's Policy Toward China – The White House.* (2018, October 4). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/>
- *President Trump's Administration is Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Through Investments and Partnerships in Economics, Security, and Governance – The White House.* (2018, November 18). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-trumps-administration-advancing-free-open-indo-pacific-investments-partnerships-economics-security-governance/>
- *The Historic Results of President Donald J. Trump's First Two Years in Office – The White House.* (2019, January 20). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/the-historic-results-of-president-donald-j-trumps-first-two-years-in-office/>

- *President Donald J. Trump Is Strengthening Ties, Improving Trade, and Deepening Our Global Partnership with Japan – The White House.* (2019, April 26). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-ties-improving-trade-deepening-global-partnership-japan/>
- *Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference – The White House.* (2019, May 27). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-conference-3/>
- *President Donald J. Trump Is Strengthening Our Historic Alliance with the Republic Of Korea – The White House.* (2019, June 28). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-historic-alliance-republic-korea/>
- *Remarks by President Trump, Prime Minister Abe, and Prime Minister Modi Before Trilateral Meeting | Osaka, Japan – The White House.* (2019, June 28). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-prime-minister-abe-prime-minister-modi-trilateral-meeting-osaka-japan/>
- *Remarks by President Trump and President Moon of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference – The White House.* (2019, June 30). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-moon-republic-korea-joint-press-conference/>
- *The United States Welcomes the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” - United States Department of State.* (2019, July 2). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/index.html>.
- *Opening Remarks at the U.S.-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region - United States Department of State.* (2019, September 12). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/opening-remarks-at-the-u-s-taiwan-consultations-on-democratic-governance-in-the-indo-pacific-region/index.html>.
- *President Donald J. Trump Is Celebrating Our Long and Steadfast Friendship with Australia – The White House.* (2019, September 20). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-celebrating-long-steadfast-friendship-australia/>
- *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Advancing a Shared Vision.* (2019, November 4). Trump White House Archives. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf>.
- *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador Robert O'Brien at 2019 Atlantic Future Forum – The White House.* (2019, November 25). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-robert-obrien-2019-atlantic-future-forum/>
- *Senior State Department Official on State Department 2019 Successes in the East Asian and Pacific Region - United States Department of State.* (2020, January 7). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/senior-state-department-official-on-state-department-2019-successes-in-the-east-asian-and-pacific-region/>.
- *President Donald J. Trump Is Strengthening Our Strategic Partnership With India – The White House.* (2020, February 25). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-strategic-partnership-india/>
- *U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Islands: 2020 Pacific Pledge - United States Department of State.* (2020, October 1). United States Department of State. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-engagement-in-the-pacific-islands-2020-pacific-pledge/>.
- *Statement from National Security Advisor Robert C. O'Brien – The White House.* (2020, October 23). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-national-security-advisor-robert-c-obrien-102320/>
- *Statement from the Press Secretary – The White House.* (2020, September 16). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-091620/>
- *Statement from the Press Secretary – The White House.* (2020, November 20). The White House. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-112020/>
- *Highlighting Partnerships and Shared Goals at 2017 Indian Ocean Conference - United States Department of State.* (2020, December 1). United States Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/highlighting-partnerships-and-shared-goals-at-2017-indian-ocean-conference/>
- *China's Military Aggression in the Indo-Pacific Region - United States Department of State.* (2021, January 13). United States Department of State. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-military-aggression-in-the-indo-pacific-region/>
- *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific.* (2021, January 5). Trump White House Archives. Retrieved April 28, 2024, from <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf>.

아베와 트럼프의 유산? 인도 태평양에 대한 일본과 미국의 전략적 내러티브 해체

Švárová Kristýna¹, Kolmaš Michal²

¹Faculty of Social Science, Charles University

²Metropolitan University Prague

본 연구는 일본의 아베정부와 미국의 도널드 트럼프 정부가 인도 태평양에 관심을 갖게 된 배경과 그에 대한 전략적 내러티브를 살펴보고자 한다. 이를 위해 두 나라 사이에 인도 태평양 지역에 대한 공유된 비전이 있다는 가정 하에 2016년부터 2021년까지 양국의 인도 태평양 관련 주요 문서에 대한 질적 내용 분석 방법론을 바탕으로 분석하였다. 분석 결과, 일본과 미국 정부의 내러티브는 인도 태평양에 대한 뚜렷한 국가 이익과 비전을 반영하고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 미국의 내러티브는 근본적인 국가 이익에 부합하는 반면, 일본의 내러티브는 실행 가능한 지역 질서에 대한 비전을 담고 있다. 이러한 연구 결과는 향후 일본과 미국의 외교 정책을 이해하고 양국의 내러티브 전략의 형성과 확산에 대한 보다 세밀한 분석을 위한 밑거름이 되길 기대한다.

주제어: 전략적 내러티브, 인도 태평양, 자유롭고 개방적인 인도 태평양

논문접수일 June 24, 2024

논문수정일 July 1, 2024

게재확정일 July 24, 2024

Corresponding Author

Švárová Kristýna

Charles University, Faculty of Social Science, Smetanovo nábřeží 6, 110 01, Prague 1, Czech Republic

E-mail: svarova.kristyna@gmail.com

About the Authors

Švárová Kristýna holds a Master's degree in International Relations from Charles University, Czechia. Her academic work has focused on the Indo-Pacific region and strategic narratives, with a particular interest in Japan's politics. This article builds on her thesis, which examined the strategic narratives of Japan and the United States regarding the Indo-Pacific, exploring their specific interests and visions for the region.

Kolmaš Michal is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Metropolitan University Prague, Czechia, and an editor-in-chief of the Czech Journal of International Relations. His research focuses on security and politics in Asia (Japan in particular), and on environmental norms. His pieces appeared in, among others, Global Environmental Politics, the Pacific Review, Cambridge Journal of International Affairs and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.